A Sociological Investigation in to the Dynamic Power Balance between the Football League and Football Association: Using the Football League Cup as a Window for Exploration

Gareth Hopkins

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Student Declaration

This is my own original work and has not been previously submitted for a degree qualification or other academic qualification.

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Name: .....

Date: .....

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Abstract

This thesis suggests that the Football League Cup was introduced as part of a wider social policy to challenge the Football Association's position in power. Therefore, testing the figurational perspective and, using the Football League Cup as a window for exploration, this thesis has investigated the dynamic power relationship between the Football Association and Football League and, later, on to the emerging relationship with international football governing bodies – FIFA and UEFA. Therefore, this investigation has; (1) Traced the development, sociologically, of the Football League Cup and; (2) investigated the fluctuating relationship between differing football governing bodies. Such analysis is unique in that academics have failed to recognise the sociological significance in that football is the only sport in England governed by two separate authorities and, as such, this is the first dedicated investigation of its kind. Furthermore, this is the first sociological study to examine England's 'secondary' football cup competition – the Football League Cup.

Documentary analysis was the chosen research method for investigation. Specifically, to investigate the controversy surrounding the Football League Cup, newspaper analysis was conducted using two online resources – The Times Digital Archive and NewsBank Info Web. To help understand the shifting power balance between the FA and Football League, research took place at the FA headquarters in Soho, London – here, a systematic analysis of FA minutes and literature within the FA library took place.

This thesis has identified that the Football League Cup was introduced as part of an ulterior motive to challenge the position of the Football Association. In fact, this dissertation highlights that the FA have been in conflict with other associations since before their advent in 1863. Furthermore, this investigation has contradicted the claim, made by some, that the Football League Cup is 'pointless' or 'worthless'. In fact, this investigation has found that the Football League cup has proven to be extremely useful to the lesser sides that have a second opportunity to draw a 'bigger' club (as they already have this opportunity in the FA Cup) and, also, the tournament is an important asset to the Football League who were able to use the competition as a 'tool' for negotiation. Nevertheless, although the FA has been challenged throughout their existence, the organisation remains the number one authority for English professional football, formally speaking.

1. Introduction

Testing the figurational perspective, this thesis will attempt to examine the dynamic relationship between the Football League and Football Association (FA) and, later, on to the relationship between UEFA (Union of European Football Associations), FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) and the football authorities in England, using the Football League Cup as a window for investigation. This introduction will highlight why this topic is of sociological significance and, introduce the reader to the separate chapters covered within this investigation.

Whilst academics have explained how and why the split between football (soccer) and rugby has occurred, there has been little attempt to understand further divides within sport, for instance, between the Football League and FA. This is surprising considering football is a game which is regulated by two governing bodies; a unique situation for sport in this country. Indeed, football is the only professional sport in England that is governed by two separate bodies (The Football Association and Football League). The closest resemblance, domestically, is boxing which is another sport that has two domestic governing bodies but, unlike the domestic authorities for football, they control different groups of individuals – British Amateur Boxing Association (BABA) [amateur] and the British Boxing Board of Control (BBB of C) [professional]. This tenuous similarity highlights just how distinctive this thesis is and therefore merits investigation.

Previously, academic analysis has concentrated on other football related phenomena – particularly football hooliganism and, as King has noted, ‘over the last twenty-five years,

academic analysis of football has focused overwhelmingly on the issue of hooliganism' (1998, p.3). Although such an issue is worthy of sociological investigation, it is possible that examinations of football hooliganism have 'unreasonably biased research in to football' (King, 1998, p.3). Indeed, Duke (1991) has argued that football hooliganism is just one of a number of issues surrounding football and, as such, issues such as the administration of football have been relegated by some academics to a secondary position. This investigation will therefore attempt to analyse the power dynamics of domestic and, later, international relationships in the context of football in England through the medium of the Football League Cup. It would now be appropriate to draw on the controversies surrounding the League Cup competition and why it is being used as a window for exploration.

This year's Football League Cup final was between Chelsea and Tottenham Hotspur and, last year's final was between Arsenal and Chelsea; two of the most successful teams in English professional football over the last decade. Despite these high profile events, a number of laymen and journalists have questioned the competition's status. For instance, an article by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) stated, 'the League Cup was a tournament which started as a sideshow, had its moments of glory, but is now little more than a laughing stock' (2001). Also, there exist a number of debates, amongst lay people, that discuss the League Cup's 'point', 'purpose' and/or 'relevance'. Such comments are typical of what can be found through various medias, such as internet blog's[1] and discussion board's (BBC, 2008; Bleacher Report, 2008; Football Forum, 2008; The Mirror, 2008). These discussions have been prevalent, albeit, predominantly, with fans of

[1] A web log (or 'blog') is a website that provides commentary on a particular subject.

the Premiership's elite clubs, over the last decade. Journalists have suggested that the significance of the League Cup, in part, has been undermined by Premiership sides fielding 'weakened' teams. For instance, Sir Alex Ferguson (Manchester United manager) 'has been criticised for using the competition to rest his stars and blood youngsters in recent seasons' (*News of the World*, 5 January, 2003, p.76). Furthermore, an Arsenal side selected for their League Cup semi-final was described as the 'B team' (*The Sun*, 17 December, 2003, p.56) because Arséne Wenger (Arsenal manager) rested a number of their 'starting eleven'. In this regard, it has been suggested that the League Cup competition is a 'showcase for the rising talent in the Premier League' (*The Times*, 6 December, 2004, p.5); to give a more recent example, Rafa Banitez (Liverpool manager) fielded an 'under-strength' side against Arsenal in 2007 (BBC, 2007); furthermore, following Arsenal's defeat in last year's League Cup final against Chelsea (February, 2007), Arsenal's team were referred to as 'the young losers' (*The Guardia*n, 26 February, 2007) as many senior players did not feature – a policy Wenger, and other managers, including Alex Ferguson (Manchester United) and Raphael Benitez (Liverpool), adopted throughout the tournament.

Although the evidence provided thus far is anecdotal, one could suggest that such evidence demonstrates how the League Cup is not as highly valued, by elite teams, as either the FA Cup or League competitions. In fact, more recently, much emphasis has been placed on qualifying for European competition (most notably the UEFA Champions League and UEFA Cup) or even maintaining or gaining a place in the Premier League, therefore, some would argue that even the FA cup has been de-valued by many of the

elite clubs in English football. For instance, Peter Hill-Wood (Arsenal Chairman) has stated ‘we will not play our best sides in the FA cup and it will become like the Worthington [League] cup’ (*The Daily Telegraph*, 21 September 2002, p.2) when discussing a dispute over the FA and Premier League. In this regard, Fynn, writing for *The Guardian*, states that ‘all other competitions, including the FA Cup and England games, now play second fiddle to the omnipotent Premiership’ (3 November 2002). To give a final example, Wilson states that ‘leading managers treat it [FA Cup] as a lesser priority than the league’ (*The Observer*, 15 January 2006).

However, to suggest that the League Cup is viewed as ‘pointless’ or insignificant by all would be misleading. Indeed, clubs in lower divisions would view the League Cup as a realistic opportunity to progress to the latter stages of the competition and, consequently, be drawn against a ‘big team’ for a financially beneficial tie. Nevertheless, results over the last decade would suggest that it is becoming more difficult for a team outside the top division to win with an increase in pressure for Premiership teams to succeed materially. Nevertheless, the increased priority of the Football League Cup, to elite premiership teams, can perhaps be demonstrated by the following example. Gary Neville (Manchester United captain) highlighted the importance of winning the League Cup in 2006 after being knocked out of the UEFA Champions League and 14 points behind Chelsea in the Premiership standings, he quotes, ‘at the start of the season, people would say it is the lowest on our list of priorities but it is pretty high now’ (*Daily Post*, 27 January, 2006).

England and Scotland are the only countries that hold two domestic tournaments for their elite teams. With this in mind, perhaps we can suggest that knock-out competitions abroad, as well as domestically, are not regarded highly and therefore make the introduction of a second cup competition in England all the more surprising. However, as sociologists, we are not required to ask whether the League Cup is needed, but rather, to discuss why a second cup competition was introduced. Indeed, current literature is often value laden, relatively involved and lacks sociological understanding, in that authors fail to explain 'why' and 'how' the introduction of the League Cup occurred.

Investigating the Football League Cup will provide a window on an aspect of the world's major team sport and, more specifically, on the relationship between the FA and the Football League and, later on to the relationship between UEFA, FIFA and the football authorities in England. To further justify this investigation, there currently exists little, if any, sociological literature regarding the emergence and development of the Football League Cup or, what will be central to this analysis, any practical investigation in to the relationship between the FA and the Football League. Undoubtedly, one can find a step-by-step, descriptive, historical analysis of the competition via the Football League (2004) and the sponsor's website (Carling, n.d). However, such accounts are celebratory histories and the author is unlikely to have written from a relatively detached standpoint and would not have tried to explain the developments sociologically, if at all. To some degree, the introduction of the competition was a partial expression of a broader power struggle between the Football League and Football Association. As such, a focus on the relationship between the two organisations is necessary. Parallel to this investigation, to a

lesser extent, this study will provide a more adequate understanding of the social processes involved in the emergence and development of the Football League Cup.

The content of this investigation, for the most part, has been divided periodically (1960 – 1970; 1970 – 1980; 1980 – Present: The Advent of the FA Premier League). However, beforehand, I provide an overview of figurational sociology (chapter 2) because much of this thesis uses 'figurational' terminology and ideas from the outset; therefore, it is necessary for the reader to have a brief understanding of the figurational school of thought. The examination then moves on to provide a literature review of relevant work that already exists with regards to the investigation of the dynamic relationship and power struggle between the Football League and FA. Although this thesis is the first dedicated examination of this kind, there is literature that pays heed to the relationship between the two governing bodies for domestic football, albeit in brief – nevertheless, a review of literature allows the reader to assess what has been discovered in the area of work being investigated and, importantly, makes clear what needs further exploration. To understand this investigation, from 1960, contextualisation is needed. Therefore, chapter 4 examines the emergence of domestic, continental and inter-continental governing bodies (FA, Football League, UEFA and FIFA). Then, chapter 5 describes what research methods were used and explains why this process was most appropriate in attempting to conceptualise the research question and, also, describes how the research was conducted. It is then that this investigation moves towards the central foci by investigating the emergence of the Football League Cup (chapter 6) before progressing on to the main body of investigation – the dynamic relationship between the Football League and

Football Association. However, this thesis begins with a synopsis of figurational sociology.

2. Figurational Sociology: An Overview

This thesis will attempt to test the capacity of the figurational approach in helping to provide a more adequate explanation of the emergence and development of the relationship between the Football League and Football association and, later, on to continental and international football governing bodies. In doing so, this investigation will use several concepts that are integrated within the figurational approach. Most notably, the ideas of figurations, unplanned consequences, involvement and detachment, and power relations will be fundamental throughout this investigation. However, before explaining, in detail, the aforementioned concepts, one needs to understand what we mean by 'figurational' or 'process' sociology.

Figurational Sociology has been developed, primarily, from the literature of Norbert Elias and is often referred to as 'process sociology' because the theoretical perspective not only looks to examine society by examining the present but, also, by researching historical developments. Therefore, to understand the present, we must also investigate the past or, in other words, to research the topic at hand as a 'process'. Also, more fundamentally, 'process sociology' is as much about the future, as it is about the past. Elias focused, in detail, on the dynamics of relationships between people and groups of people and, for figurational sociologists, 'life' should be examined as a process. The figurational framework looks not only to investigate people's behaviour (micro-sociology) but, also, the structural development of society (macro-sociology) as a long term 'process' and therefore, importantly, looks to bridge the micro-macro gap. In this regard, Mennell states

that figurational sociology is ‘inseparably a *micro*sociological and a *macro*sociological theory’ (1998, p.94). With an emphasis placed on researching as a process it is evident where the term ‘process sociology’ derives, however, for the purposes of this investigation and for consistency, the term used will be figurational sociology. Also, it is necessary to highlight that Elias has made a significant contribution to the sociology of sport (Elias, 1978; Elias and Dunning, 1986) with, later, contemporary figurational sociologists contributing to the understanding of sport and society. It is therefore fitting that figurational sociology is tested in this sport related investigation. In this regard, King states, ‘in recent years a number of “figurational schools” [Chester and Leicester for example] have arisen that have provided valuable contributions to the sociology of sport and exercise’ (2006, p.84).

Examples of sport related studies, using a figurational framework for investigation, include: the growth of professionalism in rugby league and rugby union (Dunning and Sheard, 1979); boxing and society (Sheard, 1997); football hooliganism (Dunning, Murphy and Williams, 1986; 1998); doping and health related issues in sport (Waddington, 2000) and the globalisation of sport (Maguire, 1993; 1994). This is by no means an exhaustive list but should give you, the reader, an idea of the contribution figurational sociologists have made, to the understanding of sport and society. Having discussed how figurational sociology has been applied to sport, I will now begin to explain some of the central concepts that run throughout this sociological theory; I begin with ‘figurations’.

Central to the figurational framework is, unsurprisingly, the concept of figurations. Figurational sociologists argue that humans form chains of 'figurations' or 'interdependence' and can therefore not be separated from society (micro-macro sociology). For figurational sociologists, 'human individuals can only be understood in their interdependencies with each other, as part of networks of social relations, or what he [Elias] often referred to as figurations' (Van Krieken, 1998, p.6). Rather than seeing individuals as independent of one another, we can only understand society through the evolving networks created by interdependent figurations. Therefore, adopting a figurational approach to the investigation of the relationship between football governing bodies will enable me to focus on the network of relationships responsible for the emergence and development of this dynamic relationship and how each figuration was/is involved. Having discussed the notion of figurations, it is necessary to focus on the 'unplanned consequences' of these human chains; another concept that is central to the figurational framework.

A network of people within a figuration will often work towards a common outcome or action, however, figurational sociologists highlight that, together with planned, a number of unplanned outcomes evolve. To give a clear example of an unintended consequence, I refer to the mass production of the motor car. Of course, the mass production of the motor car meant that people could get to destinations faster than before and gave the middle and, soon after, lower classes a luxury that the bourgeoisie could only once afford. However, as an unintended consequence, mass use of the motor car has impacted, negatively, on the environment. For instance, Walsh (2000) explains, in detail, that

environmental problems associated with motor vehicle emissions include health (respiratory problems) and climate change. In this regard, Van Krieken writes, 'human beings who engage in intentional action, the outcome of the combination of human action is most often unplanned and unintended' (1998, p.6). To help illuminate the paradigm of unplanned consequences, I will provide a sporting example, using the *3 Points for a Win* investigation (Bloyce and Murphy, 2008).

During a time of 'crisis' for English professional football (early 1980s) it was suggested, by Football League administrators, that an increase in the number of goals scored would add excitement and entertainment to the game. To encourage a more attacking style of play, in 1981, the Football League increased the number of points for a win from 2 to 3. However, following the reform, not only was the increase in the number of goals scored insignificant (0.1 goals per game)[2] but, it would have a detrimental effect on the style of football played by the 'lesser teams'. According to Bloyce and Murphy, 'there are those clubs, perhaps as many as 12, for whom survival in the top division is the over-riding priority' (2008, p.17). For these relegation-avoiding clubs, the reform gave teams more to lose as well as gain and, as an unplanned consequence, led to many teams adopting a more conservative approach to the game. In this regard, Bloyce and Murphy state that less well-endowed clubs began to 'pursue a "backs-to-the-wall" strategy, that is an "eleven men behind the ball" approach' (2008, p.17); this, clearly, was not the stated intention of the three points policy.

[2] The average number of goals scored per game in the old First Division between 1970 and 1981 was 2.5. In comparison, the average number of goals scored between the years 1981 and 1992 was 2.6.

Furthermore, to understand the dynamic flux of society, or indeed of that between the Football League and FA, one must recognise that planned intentional action is interwoven with unplanned social processes. To mention 'planned' or 'unplanned' singularly would, as such, represent something of a false dichotomy. Therefore, it is the task for sociologists to analyse the transformation of intentional human action in to 'unintended patterns of social life' (Van Krieken, 1998, p.6). At this juncture, it would be appropriate to discuss the figurational concept of 'involvement and detachment'.

There have been sociological discussions as to whether it is desirable for sociologists to be wholly 'objective' or 'subjective' (Murphy, Sheard & Waddington, 2000). However, Elias (1987) suggested that conceptualising knowledge and understanding in terms of 'involvement' and 'detachment' is more adequate than arguments of 'subjectivity' and 'objectivity' as it does not involve mutually exclusive categories or radical dichotomies; in fact, it is a relational and processual conceptualisation. Elias (1987) continued to state that it is not possible, nor desirable, for researchers to be wholly detached or wholly involved: it is always a matter of degrees. Murphy et al. support this statement by suggesting we are all 'prone to degrees of involvement and detachment' (2000, p.94). Nevertheless, in order to achieve a more reality-congruent explanation of the research question, it is important that we stay relatively detached. Elias (1978) suggests that we can try to achieve relative detachment by taking a detour via detachment, where we use our involvement to become interested in the research topic concerned and then step back, or become detached, from our involvement so we can arrive at a more sociologically adequate conclusion. It is therefore important as sociologists to remember two things.

Firstly, we should not take ideologies or statements at face value, and, secondly, we should keep as close to the more detached end of the continuum as possible, because our 'strong emotional involvement will distort our understanding' and we should therefore 'seek, when engaged in research, to maintain a relatively high degree of detachment' (Waddington, 2000, p.4). I will now move on to discuss the last figurational concept, within this review, of 'power'.

When discussing the concept of power, the terms 'powerful' and 'powerless' sit rather uncomfortably amongst figurational sociologists. These expressions would suggest that power is absolutist, when in fact, for figurational sociologists, all those within society are 'inextricably bound up with power chances' (Mennell, 1998, p.95). Certainly, there are individuals or groups of individuals that will have more power chances than others, however, for Elias, we must understand power as a structural characteristic of a relationship rather than a 'thing' someone possesses; 'we depend on others; others depend on us' (1978, p.93). To elaborate on this point, the longer the chain of interdependence or, wider the web of figurations, the more dependant individuals become and, therefore, it becomes more unlikely an individual will 'have' absolute power. Elias goes on to state that 'power balances, like human relationships in general are bi-polar at least, and usually multi-polar' (1978, p.74). For example, a sports official has power over those participating, but the participants also have power over those 'in charge', in proportion to the fact that without participants, the official cannot be employed. Also, more subtly, officials and competitors influence one another at various points in the game. For example, a player may 'simulate' a foul to 'hoax' the official in to given an

incorrect decision. Conversely, the official will demonstrate his or her 'power' by awarding free-kicks or giving yellow or red cards. Although this example refers to a 'bi-polar' or 'two-way' relationship, Elias was explicit in suggesting that power balances in the wider society are always 'multi-polar' in that they involve complex figurations of interdependent individuals (Dunning, 1999, p.192). Put simply, according to Dunning, what Elias is suggesting is twofold: (1) that power is 'polymorphous' and inherent in all human relationship; and (2) that the key to understanding power lies in the interdependency of people' (1999, p.191).

Testing the figurational framework has been justified for this investigation given the theme of my exploration – power relations, which, is a central concept of the figurational perspective. Also, figurational sociology has been tested, successfully, in a sporting context, by a number of sociologists and, consequently, has contributed to the understanding of sport and society. It is for these reasons I have chosen to test the figurational approach. Given that the figurational approach looks to investigate the topic at hand as a process, it is necessary to provide an historical, contextual analysis of how the relationship between the Football Association, Football League and, later, other international football governing bodies emerged. However, before doing so, I will highlight what literature already exists regarding the relationship between football governing bodies.

3. Literature Review

Even though a number of authors have commented rather briefly, in passing, on the relationship between the Football Association and Football League, there is nothing substantial on what is, it is argued here, a very important dimension of the football dynamic. This is somewhat surprising considering that football is a game which is regulated by two governing bodies; a unique situation for sport in this country. An investigation in to the dynamic relationship between the FA and Football League has been ignored in favour of other football related studies. Many academics have investigated a plethora of football related phenomena, including: the split between rugby and football (Dunning & Sheard, 1979); football hooliganism (Dunning, Murphy & Williams, 1986; 1998); football and injuries (Roderick, 2000; 2006) and; the globalisation of football (Maguire, 1998; Guilianotti & Robertson, 2004) - to name a few. There has also been much literature published regarding the development of the Football Association (Green, 1953; Mason, 1980; Butler, 1991; Dunning, 1999; Harvey, 2005), however, fewer texts have examined the development of the Football League[3], although this is mentioned, briefly, in literature that discusses the development of football as a generic topic (Murray, 1994; Walvin, 1994; Russell, 1997; Kerrigan, 2005; Taylor, 2007). Nevertheless, this chapter will review literature that has discussed, albeit momentarily, the changing relationship between the Football League and FA.

[3]Inglis, S. (1988). League Football: and the men who made it 1888 – 1988 – being the most notable reference.

Simon Inglis provides the most comprehensive discussion on relations between the Football Association and Football League in 'League Football and the Men Who Made it' (1988). The work conducted by Inglis has three main foci: the origins and development of the football league; the stories of the men who made it and, importantly to this investigation, 'the interplay between the League and its constituent members' (1998, p.v). These members include the FA, the Players Football Association (PFA) and the Government. Although this text was a good starting point for investigation it is necessary to note that the focus on 'interplay' between the two domestic football governing bodies is somewhat underrepresented in comparison to the other two areas. Also, Inglis fails to highlight the relationship between domestic and later emerging continental football governing bodies such as FIFA and UEFA[4]. Furthermore, the work by Inglis is rather descriptive and thus lacks a sociological dimension to his writing.

Whilst Inglis highlights the relationship between the Football League and FA throughout the text, there is little attempt to describe how the power-balance ratio between the two authorities has fluctuated. Indeed, Inglis states that the Football League was 'forever trying to establish itself as an independent authority' (1988, p.11) but fails to explain the shift in power between the two authorities for football over time. To give an example, Inglis writes how in 1918 the 'League had leapt to its [FA] rescue with a grant of £1000' (1988, p.100) but fails to mention how cooperation with the FA would impact on the hierarchal position, formally speaking, with the Football Association – especially as he describes the Football League, at this time, the FA's 'saviour' (1998, p.100); surely more

[4] See chapter 4 for details on FIFA and UEFA.

responsibility and/or respect would have been afforded to the Football League following this gesture of goodwill and, thus, increasing the League's power chances. To give a further example, Inglis explains that during the 1940s 'both the FA secretary, Stanley Rous, and the chairman, Amos Brook Hirst, were patently sympathetic towards the League' (1988, p.180) but, again, fails to explain how this would impact on the power 'given' to the Football League as an organisation. Indeed, Inglis 'describes' rather than 'analyses' the relationship between the Football League and Football Association throughout the text and, for this reason, the reader is unable to conceptualise the changes in power balance between the two domestic governing bodies for football. As mentioned earlier, Inglis does not mention, in any detail, the relationship between domestic and later emerging overseas football governing authorities (admittedly as it was not his intention) . However, there exists an important collection of works in an edited book by Brown – Fanatics! Power, Identity & Fandom in Football (1998) - that does pay particular attention to the relationship between the two most influential continental and inter-continental football establishments (UEFA and FIFA) and, later, in less detail, on the relationship between the FA and Football League.

In chapter two, Lee (1998) focuses on the financial problems facing English football clubs in the 1990s and the increase in commercialisation opportunities for English professional football. As such, there is mention to the formation of the FA Premier League. In this regard, Lee states, 'the FA sought to harness football's rapidly growing commercial potential and reconcile the top clubs' demands for a larger share of revenue with the interests of smaller clubs through the creation of an eighteen-team Premier

League' (1998, p.35). However, this analysis, regarding the advent of the FA Premier League, is far too simplistic and requires much more investigation - undoubtedly there were other reasons as to why the Football Association created a breakaway league. Indeed, Lee mentions how the 'Football League protected the interests of the lower Division clubs' (1998, p.34) but, fails to highlight that the Football Association unquestionably saw this ethos as an opportunity to protect the interests of the 'bigger' teams and, by forming the Premier League, would demonstrate an increase in power for the FA. Furthermore, introducing a rival league was clearly an attempt to challenge the Football League and bolster the FAs position as the most significant authority for football in England – this juncture therefore needed further examination. There is a further criticism in that Lee fails to adequately contextualise the relationship between the FA and Football League.

With regards to contextualisation, Lee goes as far to mention that 'inequalities within the Premier League and between it and the Football League can be traced back at least as far as the mid-1980s, [with] growing dissatisfaction with the distribution of revenue' (1998, p.35). However, this is far too simplistic and, in fact, the Football League and FA have been in conflict over financial discrepancies prior to the 1980s. To give an example, Lord Westwood (former Newcastle United Chairman), commentating in 1972 states, 'that the FA was taking too big a slice of the financial cake' (Inglis, 1988, p.259) and that more monies should be redistributed to the Football League. Furthermore, Inglis describes how there were disputes with how much the Football League were receiving for International matches – a disagreement that occurred in the 70s. Also, of course, tensions, in general,

have existed between the FA and Football League since the League's advent in 1988; rivalry between the two organisations is not a contemporary phenomenon. A greater contextualisation would allow for a better understanding as to why the FA Premier League was introduced in 1992.

In chapter one, Sugden, Tomlinson and Darby (1998) focus on the emergence of FIFA as the world's first official international football governing body and why the organisation was inaugurated. Moreover, the chapter illuminates tensions between UEFA and FIFA from the emergence of UEFA in 1954 to present day and attempts to highlight, as Sugden et al. describes, the 'push' and 'pull' combination between UEFA and FIFA (1998, p. 13). Although this particular literature has been instrumental in describing the relationship between UEFA and FIFA and, later, a third continental confederation, CAF (Confédération Africaine de Football), little investigation has been conducted to describe the relationship between local English football governing bodies (FA and Football League) and their continental and inter-continental counterparts. This thesis will focus on the broader dynamic relationships between domestic and continental football governing bodies and attempt to conceptualise the changing relationship between them.

Although authors have mentioned, at best, the relationship between the Football Association and Football League and the relationship between FIFA and UEFA, nobody has examined the relationship between domestic football governing authorities and their continental and inter-continental counterparts. Also, when the relationship between football governing bodies has been examined there has been a consistent failure to

explain how the fluctuating relationship has affected the balance of power for the governance of football at both domestic and world level. Nevertheless, the literature highlighted in this chapter will provide a firm foundation for further exploration and will allow for greater examination when investigating the dynamic power relationship between the different football governing authorities. However, as mentioned, detailed contextualisation is needed so that this investigation can be traced as a process and will allow the reader to 'make sense' of subsequent developments. Therefore, this thesis will examine the emergence of the Football Association, Football League and, later, FIFA and UEFA. Moreover, this examination will attempt to highlight the early relationship and power struggles between all four football authorities.

4. A Contextualisation of Domestic and International Football Governing Bodies

In an attempt to understand the dynamic relationship between the Football League and Football Association as it exists today, it is necessary to provide a concise historical development of the emergence and responsibilities of the two organisations for contextualisation and, later, on the emergence of UEFA and FIFA. This chapter will also highlight early relationships, and shifts in power, between the domestic and, later, international governing bodies for football. However, before doing so, this chapter will discuss, in detail, how both the Football Association and Football League emerged as governing bodies.

4.1 The Emergence of the Football Association

The Football Association was established in 1863 by representatives of clubs mainly from the south, most notably, London. However, the rules implemented by the London FA were not synonymous to all those who played football across Britain. Indeed, Butler (1991) states that the rules were challenged and often ignored. By 1868 another association of football clubs was formed in Sheffield who took part under differing rules (Mason, 1980). Unsurprisingly, the Sheffield rules were developed in Sheffield by those involved with their local football team and were adhered to by those from the north and midlands; in fact, by 1862, there were as many as fifteen clubs formed in and around the Sheffield area, using these rules (Heatly, 2008). Sheffield F.C, now playing in the

Unibond First Division South, are said to have developed laws including corner kicks, free kicks and the introduction of a solid crossbar[5] (BBC, 2007a). Also, 'Sheffield Rules' included: 'no player may be held or pulled over' and 'a ball in touch is dead, consequently the side that touches it down must bring it to the edge of touch and throw it' [i.e. the 'throw in'] (Heatly, 2008, p.16). In this regard, Heatly states, that those associated with Sheffield Football Club were in 'constant re-evaluation of the rules of the game, and in introducing and re-fining several of the important features of the sport as we know it today' (2008, p.13). In 1862, one year before the FA was inaugurated, representatives from Sheffield F.C observed the proceedings at a London FA meeting but declined to join immediately (Sheffield F.C, n.d.). Importantly, this account would suggest that the FA has been in conflict with other governing bodies since its advent and, moreover, it demonstrates that the FA's conflict with other associations is nothing new. It was not until 1877 that a unified set of laws for association football were agreed upon by associates of the London FA and Sheffield FA (Mason, 1980). The new codification included some ideas from the Sheffield FA, but predominantly, incorporated rules that were administered by the London FA (Mason, 1980). Mason continues by stating that the agreement with the Sheffield FA helped strengthen the London FA as the 'game's leading authority' (1980, p.15). This view is supported by Green who states that the FA was English football's 'highest authority' (1953, p.391). Before 1877, football was a 'hopelessly fragmented game' (Butler, 1991, p.5) which consisted of a number of local Football Association's playing under differing rules. With football laws unified, we begin to see, albeit gradually, a significant step towards more centripetal organisation in that the London FA (known today as simply the FA) begin to supersede other local football

[5] Clubs from London and the south used a rope crossbar.

governing bodies. This is not to suggest that the FA ‘are’ the governing authority for football at this stage but, rather, that the process of unification for football governance has begun – put simply, football is less fragmented.

It has been argued that the status of the FA increased during the early years of development for several reasons. Firstly, other associations were being established through the 1870s (including Birmingham and Lancashire) who ‘looked to the [London] FA itself and wished to affiliate with it’ (Mason, 1980, p.15), which would suggest that the London FA was the game’s leading governing body. Also, the idea for a knock-out cup competition, the Challenge (FA) cup, was first competed for in 1871, which arguably increased the status of the FA as it was the first organised football competition of any kind. Finally, the first international match (England V Scotland) was organised by the FA which took place in Scotland in 1872 (BBC, 2005). As the Scottish FA did not exist in 1972, (formed in 1973) The FA determined much of the fixture, including the venue, officials, and, team selection for both line-ups (BBC, 2005) which, importantly, demonstrates the governing body’s increased power at the time. Here, one could suggest, that the organisation of an official international fixture for the first time and, indeed, the organisation of the challenge cup one year earlier, were tactics used in the strategic battle to be viewed as the main affiliating body for football. Although there was no domestic challenge at the time (such as that from the Sheffield FA) the FA, arguably, would have organised such events in an attempt to bolster their position as English football’s highest authority.

By the late nineteenth century there existed a plethora of local FAs, that were all affiliated to the 'central' FA and, at this stage, the FA was considered the 'ultimate authority for football, both amateur and professional' (Mason, 1980, p.16). However, for figurational sociologists, the term 'ultimate' sits rather uncomfortably alongside a relational approach to power because it is absolutist and, of course, in reality, a number of figurations contribute towards the organisation of domestic football, albeit the power balance is often skewed. Nevertheless, the biggest challenge to the FA's 'ultimate' position as England's governing body for football was the advent of the Football League in 1888.

4.2 The Emergence of the Football League

It is suggested that the idea for a structured Football League was that of William McGregor (Butler, 1991), although, it is more likely that the advent was a consequence of a number of figurations, such as, the legalisation of professional football in 1885 and the support from footballers who did not play enough matches to earn a living. In March 1888 the Football League was inaugurated and consisted of just five clubs from the north and midlands[6]. However, it was not until September 1888 that The League commenced with a total of 12 clubs. The Football League emerged to cater for the increasing professional and organised developments of the clubs. In this regard, Green writes 'out of [legalised] professionalism [1885] came the birth of the Football League in 1888' (1953, p.390). Whilst the FA was concerned with the amateur game and the supposed holistic benefits football could provide, the Football League was more focussed on

[6] Aston Villa, Blackburn Rovers, Bolton Wonderers, Preston North-End and West Bromwich Albion.

professionalism. One could argue that the advent of the Football League was an unintended consequence to the legalisation of professionalism by the FA in 1885. For Butler:

> They [clubs from north and midlands] saw football as something more than an innocent diversion, a way of housing healthy minds in healthy bodies, and there was only one road they could take. It led them away from the south's cherished concept of amateurism' (1991, p.27).

The League grew at a fast rate with the need for a second division to be formed in 1892, division three (south) in 1920 and division three (north) in 1921. During the 1958/59 season, it was decided by the Football League Committee to introduce a fourth division; clubs in the bottom half of division three north and south would join a national division four with the remainder to join the newly unified national division three.

It has been suggested that from the 1920s, the football governing body echoed a Keynesian economic framework[7], in an attempt to ensure economic and social universality within the League (King, 1998). For instance, Keynes argued that a stable economy required state intervention and, although the Football League is not a 'state', the football governing body introduced restrictions to help the financial stability of smaller clubs. Measures included, most notably, the maximum wage and the retention and

[7] Keynes (a British economist) suggested that under-consumption was a response to unemployment, as workers were not needed because goods could not be sold. Keynes argued that the state must intervene to prevent such a depression (1920s) occurring again. Specifically, Keynes argued that full employment (funded by the state) would encourage the population to spend more, thus preventing under consumption.

transfer system. These regulations prevented the wealthy clubs from acquiring all the best players and monitored pay. In this regard, Inglis writes ‘in order to protect the clubs, their right to retain a player had to be guarded, while at the same time wages and incentives were strictly regulated’ (1988, p.38). Also, as Taylor notes, ‘by limiting wages, it was hoped that the better players would have no financial motive to move clubs and thus the gap between the rich and poor would be reduced’ (2001, p.103). More importantly, and relevant to this investigation, the FA Council passed the maximum wage rule for the start of the 1901/02 season and perhaps highlights the cooperation between the Football Association and Football League at the time because, of course, ultimately, the FA were responsible for passing football laws. In fact, Inglis (1988) highlights that the maximum wage proposal was supported at the annual FA meeting in 1900 by, specifically, members of the local Staffordshire Football Association. However, it is clear that the simile made by King (1998) between Keynesian economics and the Football League is tenuous at best. For instance, no simile can be made between the need for full employment (Keynesian economics) and the specific implementations introduced (maximum wage and transfer and retention laws) at the time. For this reason, one could argue that the comparison between Keynesian economics and the Football League is weak but, nevertheless, an issue worth highlighting as the introduction of the maximum wage law demonstrates an increase in cooperation between the two domestic football governing bodies at the time.

To further understand these developments it is necessary to be aware of the broader social context. Regulations initiated by the Football League were introduced at a time when

British society was unstable and in depression. Such policy was therefore introduced to create stability in the League at a time when there was unrest within the broader society. For King, 'the maximum wage minimised the cost of football and, therefore, maintained at least some parity between the big [and small] clubs' (1998, p.40). However, prominent individuals within the FA later disagreed with the transfer system and believed that the player should be treated as an individual, which meant no limitations on his earnings or freedom of movement (Inglis, 1988). The maximum wage was eventually abolished in 1961. There is an amalgamation of reasons as to why the FA moved from supporting the maximum wage to a more pro-professionalism stance. Primarily, and perhaps most importantly, the maximum wage regulations became hard to regulate. Of course, the maximum wage did not remain at £4 per week. Here, it is necessary to provide, in detail, an account of how the maximum wage limits shifted, over a 50 year period, to demonstrate the problems regulating such a law.

By 1910, each player could earn an extra 10 shillings per week after two years service and an additional 10 shillings after a further two years service to any one football team; therefore, professional footballers could now earn up to £5 per week (Taylor, 2001). In 1920, the maximum wage was increased further to a possible £9 per week (with a rise of £1 per week for each year served at any one football club, over a maximum of four years), only to be reduced once more in 1922 to £8 per week (Taylor, 2001). Also, during the 1920s there was an introduction of win bonuses for FA cup games: £2 for a win, £1 for a draw, £4 for a win in the semi-finals and £5 for winning the final (Taylor, 2001). In the 1930s, the FA Council introduced an incentive for first team players who could earn

£6 per week plus an extra £2 per week for keeping their first team place (Taylor, 2001). In this regard, Taylor notes 'the maximum wage was far from standard' (2001, p.105). In fact, the number of 'illegal or under-the-counter payments' perhaps demonstrates the difficulties in regulating the maximum wage law (Taylor, 2001, p.110). For example, Fred Rinder (FA Director at the time) explained to the FA Council, in 1908, that 'the rules restricting wages, signing-on fees and bonuses were being broken daily' (Talylor, 2001, p.110). Furthermore, Taylor and Ward (1995) suggest that 'backhanders' were common in the 1950s. The above evidence would suggest that over a fifty year period, amendments to the maximum wage rule, made it difficult to regulate. Also, one could argue that regular revision to the ruling was too time consuming and, partly for these reasons, the FA became inclined to a more pro-professional position.

Coupled with difficulties regulating the maximum wage rule, there was also pressure from top football professionals and players unions to eradicate the maximum wage regulation; notably, the Professional Footballers' Association (PFA). It was, unsurprisingly, the elite footballers who often complained about wages. Taylor states that many saw the £6 wage restriction as an 'insufficient reward', especially when they were playing at international level (2001, p.112). To further understand why the FA moved to a pro-professional stance we need to investigate the wider sporting context. For instance, there was no maximum wage restriction for those participating in the Scottish Football League and, perhaps surprisingly, considering the low popularity of football in the United States, footballers who applied their trade in the American Soccer League (ASL). Those playing in the ASL, during the 1920s, were paid between £12 and £20 compared to £6

per week paid in England (Taylor, 2001). Furthermore, sportsmen such as jockeys, boxers and baseball players were all paid higher wages compared to professional footballers who participated in England. From the evidence given, one could therefore argue that the FA turned to a more pro-professional stance between the early to mid 1900s because of: difficulties policing the maximum wage; pressure from professional footballers and player unions and, that the comparative wage paid in other countries was considerably higher. Indeed, other figurations may have contributed to the abolition of the maximum wage in 1961, however, more importantly, the differing opinion regarding professionalism demonstrates early friction between the two governing authorities. In this regard, Inglis states that 'friction between the two bodies [is], of course, nothing new' (1988, p.219). I will now explain why the FA's support to abolish the maximum wage law is significant in understanding the relationship and power struggle between the FA and Football League.

It is somewhat surprising that the FA supported pro-professionalism - given that it is an organisation based on principles such as 'muscular Christianity' and 'amateurism'. An alliance between the FA and the 'big' clubs (most of who opposed the maximum wage law) would have unquestionably lent itself in favour of the Football Association. A pro-professional stance would have given the FA the support of the most 'attractive' teams in the League with the relationship between the Football League and 'bigger' clubs deteriorating. Not only would this have bolstered the FA's hierarchal position, formally speaking, it would have had a detrimental effect on the Football League's financial position if the more powerful clubs were to break away and form an independent League

with the FA (which, would eventually happen with the formation of the FA Premier League in 1992). One assumes that the FA, as an organisation, firmly believed in abolishing the maximum wage law – or was it a strategy to appease the top clubs and conjure support in their favour? Indeed, it appears strange that an organisation that was formed on the very premise of 'amateurism' and 'muscular Christianity' would suddenly support such a pro-professional modification to the laws of football. Here, I argue that support for abolition of the maximum wage law was part of a wider policy to challenge the Football League as the significant football authority in England. To further understand the relationship between the FA and Football League it is necessary to highlight the responsibilities of both affiliations.

4.3 Responsibilities of the Football League and Football Association

The FA was, and still is, responsible for several regulatory aspects of the game. However, responsibilities between the FA and other governing bodies, such as the Football League and, later, UEFA and FIFA, have been, and arguably still are, both ambiguous and confusing. In this regard, Green argues that 'glancing across the whole complicated evolution between the Football Association and Football League one can see the danger clearly enough of becoming enmeshed in a plethora of detail' (1953, p.394). Nevertheless, I will attempt to explain the responsibilities of the FA and Football League, in their simplest terms for now. The FA suggests they are responsible for 'all regulatory aspects of the game of football in England' (Football Association, 2004). According to the official FA website, the organisation is responsible for: (1) 'promoting the

development of the game amongst all ages, backgrounds and abilities in terms of participation and quality' (2); 'sanctioning, either directly or indirectly, all matches, leagues and competitions played in England' (3); 'overseeing the administration of the disciplinary system, which is applicable to all participants in the game…and the administration of refereeing throughout the game' and (4); 'organising a number of senior men's, youth and women's national competitions…and the participation of England national representative teams' (Football Association, 2004). Finally, and perhaps most notably, the FA are responsible for 'regulating the game on and off the field of play through the "Laws of the Game" and the "Rules of The Association" ' (Football Association, 2004). Indeed, Green states that the laws of the game are a 'direct concern of the FA' (1953, p.395), although, strictly speaking, this is incorrect.

The laws of the game are decided by the International Football Association Board (IAFB), not the FA. In this regard, FIFA state, 'the Laws of the Game are the preserve of the International Football Association Board' (FIFA, 2008). The IFAB is composed of eight representatives: one from England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland and four from FIFA. In this regard, Gray suggests that the English FA is in a 'privileged position' as four of the eight IFAB representatives are from Britain (2005, p.5). However, this statement is clearly flawed as to assume that FA representatives from the British Isles will collaborate is both speculative and unfounded. In reality, there is more than likely a conflict in interests and power struggle between members of the English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish FA's. Therefore, it is in fact FIFA, with four representatives, who have the biggest influence over any modifications made to the laws of the game. Also, the FA has

no bearing on the amendments of any rulings outside their own league and domestic cup competitions. For instance, any English Football Club who takes part in a competition organised by either UEFA or FIFA may have to adhere to rules that are different to those domestically. To give an example, the 'golden goal' (introduced 1993) and 'silver goal' (introduced 2002) rules were both used in European club competitions, the European Cup and World Cup but, not in the FA Cup or Football League Cup. It is also worth highlighting that the FA does not regulate all aspects of the game outside of the Premier League. The Football League is responsible for dealing with its own domestic infringements such as late starts, although, this is not the case for Premier League matches, where the Football League has no jurisdiction. At this point it would be appropriate to highlight the responsibilities of the Football League.

It is interesting to note that the responsibilities of the Football League are not published as clearly or prevalently compared to the FA. In fact, the League's responsibilities are not published on their website, and when they are mentioned in literature, it is often a vague summary. It could be suggested that this represents the Football League's 'secondary position', in that the FA are responsible for 'all regulatory aspects of the game of football in England' (Football Association, 2004). To research the responsibilities of the Football League an e-mail was sent via the official Football League website. The response was from Patricia Brown (Customer Services Officer for the Football League). Unlike the Football Association, the Football League does not appear to have a dedicated historian who can answer, in detail, questions relating to their organisation. Indeed, 'Customer Service Officer' appears to be an ambiguous term and I would therefore query whether

Brown is in a position to answer my question in adequate detail. Nevertheless, the reply was interesting. Firstly, Brown (personal communication, August 1, 2007) highlights that 'The Football League provides a national membership organisation' and 'it is these Clubs that make up the "membership" of the League'. Once affiliated to the Football League, the organisation has the ability to determine if the clubs are able to participate in their competitions, and penalise a club if they have been deemed to breach a particular rule. To give a recent example, Leeds United started the 2007/2008 campaign with minus fifteen points as a punishment for going in to administration. Although, it must be remembered that the Football League does not have any responsibility, and therefore, cannot discipline those participating in the Premier League, those teams outside of the Football League, or indeed, the FA cup. Nor can the Football League penalise individual players; this is the responsibility of the FA. Furthermore, football clubs have the right to appeal to the FA if they feel a penalty sanctioned by the Football League is unjust. For instance, following the 15 point penalty incurred by Leeds United (from the Football League) at the beginning of the 2007/2008 season Leeds United appealed to the FA (BBC, 2007b), albeit unsuccessfully. Here we can suggest that this reflects the dominant position of the FA compared to the Football League in that the appeal process would usually be dealt with by a higher authority and, represents the complexity with regards to responsibility between the FA and Football League. The above would suggest that very little authority is afforded to the Football League, and most is afforded to the FA. Again, this represents the Football Association's position, domestically, as the leading governing body for football.

From the outset, one can see that there was, and still is, confusion over responsibility and a number of discrepancies between the two organisations. For instance, responsibilities between the two organisations are unclear and during the early years there were disagreements over professionalism, specifically, disputes over wages and transfer systems. For Butler, the initial response to the Football League from the FA was 'lukewarm' (1991, p.31). To give a further example, Green suggests that the FA old guard were not keen on such an 'unruly boy in the house' (1953, p.390) and, for Williams, the 'die was cast for more than 100 years of uneasy cross-class governance of English football between the two bodies' (Leicester Mercury, 4 October 2002, p.35).

Although the emergence of the Football League was met with much early resentment from FA representatives, it would be both simplistic and misguiding to suggest that the relationship between the two governing bodies was one of conflict and friction alone. For instance, W. Pickford, a member of the FA council and commenting in the 1930s, stated that the Football League gave the game a 'new lease of life' because of their commitment to increasing the number of clubs playing the game; for Pickford, this was 'good for football' (Green, 1953, p.390). Pickford continues by stating that the Football League and FA are a 'happy family party' and 'today, I look upon the League as a strong arm and reliable ally at the service of the National Governing Body' (Green, 1953, p.380). Also, of course, interdependencies between the Football League, FA and, of course, the broader social network exists today. To give a more recent example, the Football League provides the foundations for which the FA Premier League is built on. For Lord Mawhinney (current Chairman of the Football League), 'a strong Football League helps to build the

pyramid on the top of which they [FA Premier League] sit.' (Guardian, 23 July 2007). Equally, the FA provides financial assistance to the Football League. For instance, next season (2008/2009), the Football Association will give the Football League £100 million to support the Football League's 72 member clubs (Guardian, 23 July 2007). The relationship between the Football League and FA alongside the emergence of the Football League Cup can only be more adequately understood by examining the various struggles between groups and individuals over power, resources and status, over an extended period of time. However, it is of importance to note, of course, that since the development of both the Football League and Football Association there have been developments that have led to the emergence of continental and inter-continental governing bodies for football; UEFA and FIFA. Here I will trace the historical development of both authorities and, later, attempt to highlight the relationship between UEFA, FIFA, the Football League and the FA.

4.4 The Emergence of FIFA

It is here that I focus, in some detail, on the emergence of The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). Such a detailed analysis is required because the introduction of FIFA would be the first major challenge to the FA since the emergence of the Football League in 1888. In doing so I will attempt to trace the emergence of FIFA whilst assessing the impact it would have on the relationship with the FA and, of course, how the emergence of FIFA would impact on the balance of power for the governance of world football.

FIFA was inaugurated in 1904 in response to a number of figurations. Partly, the advent of the organisation was to cater for the 'widespread enthusiasm within Europe for international matches' (Lanfranchi, Eisenberg, Mason & Wahl, 2004, p.58) and, partly in an attempt to unify the laws of the game internationally. At the same time, Lanfranchi et al. suggest that 'European footballers were mesmerised by British football and wanted to be recognised there' (2004, p.58). The document was signed, in 1904, by representatives from France, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland (FIFA, 1994), but, not the English Football Association. Like the response to the advent of the Football League, The English FA's reaction to an international governing body for football was that of resentment. In fact, when the idea was proposed to the FA in 1902 the response was slow but the organisation eventually 'deigned to reply' (Lanfranchi et al. 2004, p.58) albeit the response was ambiguous in that they invited the European football associations to a meeting in England but did not indicate where and when this would take place (Lanfranchi et al. 2004). When the meeting eventually took place, in 1903, the efforts of the representatives were 'in vain' (Lanfranchi et al. 2004, p.59) and Guerin (the French representative) was 'upset at the ignorance of continental football that the British showed' (Lanfranchi et al. 2004, p.59). It is likely that the FA viewed the advent of a world governing body for football as a threat to their position as football's highest authority. Of course, the game, at this time, was played under the rules and regulations published by the Football Association. More importantly, the advent of a world governing body would have threatened to replace these laws and, moreover, threatened the FA's position as the world's highest football governing authority.

However, in reality, during the early years, FIFA did not supersede the position of the FA.

Primarily FIFA were preoccupied with standardising the rules regarding international matches. In fact, FIFA were, and still are, responsible for most issues concerning the regulation of international football matches (although responsibility was undoubtedly shared following the introduction of UEFA). Therefore, FIFA were not in a position to discipline domestic associations such as the English FA. Actually, in April 1905, the FA organised a meeting of all European Associations in London and, as Lanfranchi et al. state, 'ignoring the existence of FIFA' (2004, p.61). What's more, FIFA appeased the FA on a number of occasions, which would suggest that FIFA recognised the FA' s position as the number one governing body for football. For example, FIFA would only authorise matches between clubs affiliated via their FA to FIFA (despite their absence from the federation); 'a new gesture of goodwill towards the English' (Lanfranchi et al. 2004, p.61). Furthermore, FIFA would only grant membership to associations that were alone in controlling football in their country which the FA supported. Maybe, in part, it was this policy of appeasement that encouraged the FA to eventually join FIFA in 1906. Also, it is likely that members of the FA did not wish to isolate the organisation from FIFA. Of course, if the FA lost their 'stranglehold' on FIFA the Football Association would not be able to influence any subsequent developments to the game of football which, in turn, would threatened their position as 'ultimate' governing body for football.

In effect, for around the first ten years, FIFA were focussed on achieving agreement on their statutes, rather than governing the game of football. For instance, agreement was needed on the meaning of the term 'country' and the problem of players who changed nationality (Lanfranchi et al. 2004). It was not until 1911, eight years on, that FIFA challenged the FA's global hierarchal position in any way. The German representatives suggested FIFA should 'eventually become the regulatory body for the laws of the game' (Lanfranchi et al. 2004, p.64), a suggestion that was not considered at this time, by the FIFA committee and, moreover, heightened tension between FIFA and the FA. This was a poor strategic move as FIFA was in no position to challenge the FA's authority at this juncture; FIFA, by 1911, had 'no headquarters and no jurisdiction over either the laws of the game or the [English Domestic] competitions themselves' (Lanfranchi et al. 2004, p.64). Put simply, FIFA had very little political clout at this time and were in no position to confront the FA and, significantly, the unwillingness to challenge the FA's position demonstrates FIFAs secondary position, formally speaking, to the Football Association. Nevertheless, between 1914 and 1931 FIFA grew as a global organisation as the number of affiliated associations increased dramatically.

By 1914, non-European associations such as South Africa, Chile, Canada and the United States joined FIFA and by 1924 all European countries had joined, including the English FA (1919) which increased affiliated members from six to more than forty (Lanfranchi et al. 2004). Importantly, some of the aforementioned members were affiliated to the FA before joining FIFA which, one could argue, represents the shifting balance of power in that FIFA, as a football governing body, begins to supersede the FA, albeit some twenty

years after their inauguration. In 1927 Cuba and Costa Rica joined FIFA which gave the governing body a 'freehold in Central America' (Lanfranchi et al. 2004, p.69) and undoubtedly strengthened their position in an attempt to become the worlds leading governing body for football, although, the federation did face a set back in that the FA resigned from the organisation in 1928 over a dispute over professionalism. Nevertheless, although FIFA was developing as a world governing body for football, in June 1930, the federation made it clear that they would not intervene with domestic issues and that 'FIFA should remain a community of interests for the national football associations and not a federation which issued orders to its members' (Lanfranchi et al. 2004, p.73). Furthermore, at The Berlin Congress in May 1931 FIFA confirmed they 'would not get involved with the internal affairs of these associations' (Lanfranchi et al. 2004, p.74) and were content with implementing the FA's rules and regulations for international fixtures. Here, this demonstrates FIFA's unwillingness to challenge the position of the FA and, would suggest, that although FIFA was growing as a governing body, they had not superseded the position of the FA. Moreover, the FA had still not rejoined their federation which, one could argue, de-valued the status of the organisation. However, between 1931 and 1945 FIFA had increased political clout, with regards to the governance of football, as the organisation developed in a number of ways.

Between 1931 and 1940 FIFA continued to grow in a plethora of ways. For instance, in 1931, there were major changes to the statutes, in that the executive committee now included a President, two Vice Presidents and six members, one of whom was responsible for finances (Lanfranchi et al. 2004) which, importantly, would suggest that

the organisations financial position had increased, thus, increasing their status as the world governing body for football. In this regard Lanfranchi et al. suggest that FIFA received 1% of all international match revenues; this equalled 17 902 Swiss francs in 1932 and 25 000 in 1933 (2004, p.74). Furthermore, FIFA now had a nucleus to work from in that the headquarters were established in Zurich. Arguably, as Lanfranchi et al. suggest, the abovementioned meant that FIFA 'had eventually become a regulatory organisation driven by a principle of decentralisation and independence of the [50] member association' (2004, p.74). Now, FIFA were eventually in a position to challenge the FA as the number one authority for governing world football. In this regard, Lanfranchi et al. state that FIFA had an 'increasingly influential stronghold on world football' (2004, p.76). During the development of FIFA, another football governing body emerged that would impact on the position of the FA and, indeed, Football League.

4.5 The Emergence of UEFA

The Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA) was established on 15 June 1954 in Basle (Switzerland) [UEFA, 2007a]. According to the UEFA website, the organisation was inaugurated to assist the 'fostering and development of unity and solidarity among the European football community' (UEFA, 2007a). However this definition is far too simplistic and, in reality, the administration was established as a consequence to a range of other figurations. For instance, as mentioned earlier, FIFA was developing rapidly and, therefore, would need some support. In this regard, Sugden, Tomlinson and Darby state that 'after the Second World War. Membership of FIFA

began to expand to the extent that there was perceived to be a need for a degree of regionalisation and decentralisation of administrative functions' (1998, p.11). However the introduction of UEFA cannot be solely attributed to administrative purposes. Those within the European federations were supportive of the regionalisation idea as many felt they were being politically out-manoeuvred by the Latin Americans who were trying to move the game in a new direction by voicing their own innovative ideas and, moreover, considered them a 'threat to their privileged position within world football's power structure' (Sugden, Tomlinson & Darby, 1998, p.11). A unified governing body for European football was seen to give Europe a political stance within FIFA. For Sugden, Tomlinson and Darby, 'The Establishment of UEFA gave Europe a collective voice within the world governing body and eased the emergence of two Englishmen, Arthur Drewry and Stanley Rous, who held the reins of FIFA from 1956 until the mid 1970s' (1998, p.13). Therefore, it could be suggested that the distribution of power in world football was a major reason for UEFA's formation in 1954. Arguably, not only did the advent of UEFA undermine the position of the football governing bodies in the Americas but, importantly, European football now had a 'leading say in the pace and direction of world football' (Sugden, Tomlinson & Darby, 1998, p.13). Also, the fact that UEFA supported FIFA being lead by English nationals would demonstrate a certain degree of respect for the position of the English FA.

UEFA, as an organisation, grew at a fast rate. In 1954 UEFA had three full time personnel which grew to over 200 in the space of just over fifty years (UEFA, 2007a). Also, when the body was founded, there were a total of 28 governing bodies affiliated to

UEFA which has risen to a total of 53. UEFA suggest that it is a 'supporting authority which doesn't have the powers of a government; it represents Europe's national football associations, and can only act in accordance with the wishes of these associations' (UEFA, 2007a). This would suggest that UEFA has no formal say over decisions made by the FA and, importantly, would suggest that the FA had 'more' power opportunities, than UEFA, during their early development[8]. Having traced the emergence of the football organisations for domestic, European and world football, I will now summarise.

From the above historical contextualisation, one could argue that the Football Association, UEFA and FIFA are best described as a triumvirate for world football. This is not to say that the Football League had no power but, rather, in comparison to the FA, UEFA and FIFA it was, and arguably still is, limited. No one football governing body has had 'total' power and, as highlighted, the dynamic power balances have shifted constantly. Having contextualised, this thesis will move towards the more central aspects of this investigation. As such, it would be necessary to explain how the research was

[8] Responsibilities of UEFA: 1) The organisation of European Cups including the European Champion Clubs' Cup (Champions League), the Inter-Cities' Fairs Cup (UEFA Cup) as well as the European Championships for International teams; 2) improving 'safety and security at football matches'; 3) 'increase access and participation, without discrimination on grounds of gender, religion or race'; 4) 'support growth in the grassroots of the game'; 5) 'achieve commercial success and sound finances without distorting the sporting qualities of our competition'; 6) 'use UEFA's revenues to support re-investment and re-distribution in the game in accordance with the principle of solidarity between all levels and areas of sport'; 7) 'target specific aid and assistance to help member associations with the greatest need'; 8) 'promote positive sporting values, including fair play and anti-racism, as well as safe and secure match environments'; 9) 'run an anti-doping programme aimed at preserving the ethics of sport, safeguarding the players' health and ensuring equal chances for all competitors'; 10) 'act as a representative voice for the European football family'; 11) 'ensure a coherent approach to decision-makers and opinion-formers on issues of relevance to European football'; 12) 'maintain good relations with the other continental football confederations and FIFA'; 13) 'ensure that the needs of the different stakeholders are properly reflected in UEFA's thinking'.

Source: UEFA 2007b; 2007c.

conducted in an attempt to understand the changing power relationship between the Football League and Football Association.

5. Research Methods

Documentary analysis was deemed the most appropriate method in order to adequately research the relationship between the Football League and Football Association. This involved a wide range of sources, in particular a systematic analysis of internet newspaper sources, FA minutes, and books from the FA library.

Documentary analysis covers a wide variety of sources, including official statistics, photographs, texts and visual data (May, 2003). Bloyce has argued that 'when engaged in socio-historical analysis [as is my research question] documentary analysis can be a useful research tool' (2004, p.158). Documents such as newspapers, books, magazines and government minutes can be read and preserved so that they are available for analysis by the social researcher (Bryman, 2004). The extent of their relevance depends, however, on the adequacy of the document chosen for the phenomena being investigated. With reference to the research topic under scrutiny here, newspaper analysis was deemed the most appropriate because of the centrality of the media to the broader aspects of this dissertation. They tell us about the aspirations and intentions of the people to which they refer and 'describe places and social relationships at a time when we may not have been born, or were simply not present' (May, 2003, p.176). Also, this method allows one to learn about society as well as the research question and will therefore allow for contextualisation. For figurational sociologists, it is only by examining the wider social processes can such an adequate, more reality congruent analysis emerge (Elias, 1978;

Maguire, 1988; Dunning, 1999). Research began with a search for articles on the Football League Cup using internet newspaper analysis.

The Times Digital Archive and NewsBank InfoWeb were used to research the question at hand. Conducting research using internet databases allowed for quicker searches and, of course, this method was less laborious than searching through master copies which allowed for a wider search. However, there also exist limitations to researching newspapers online. It was unclear how 'important' (although, of course, all news is important) or 'prominent' an article was and, thus, the strength of the evidence remained questionable. In this regard Li states:

> Most newspaper readers understand clearly that articles placed above the fold on the front page are the most important in that issue and that the story with the largest headline is the top story for the day. Online, however, these prominence cues can become more difficult to interpret' (2006, p.284).

Primarily, articles from The Times newspapers (internet source) were examined from January 1st 1959 to December 31st 1961 which included the years immediately before and after the advent of the Football League Cup (1960). These years were considered feasible because it was hypothesized that speculation leading up to the League Cup Competition and, the reaction to the competition a year later, would provide a number of examples demonstrating the controversy surrounding the tournament - it was predicted that commentary of the Football League Cup would be amplified during this period. Key

words used were: ‘football’, ‘league’ and ‘cup’ (in title, citation, and abstract only) which yielded one result. Therefore, the same search was done ‘in entire article content’ which produced 83 results. Twelve examples were extracted from the results generated and used within this investigation.

To search for more contemporary articles (between 2006 and 2008), NewsBank InfoWeb was used to search for archive editions of The Times (available from 1985 onwards) plus a range of other major national broadsheet and tabloid daily newspapers published in the UK[9] (most available from 1998). Key words used were, again, ‘football’, ‘league’ and ‘cup’ within ‘entire content’. A total of 15 relevant and up to date examples were extracted to demonstrate that controversy surrounding the Football League Cup tournament has existed for an extended period of time – not merely around the competition’s advent. The anecdotal evidence collated, through internet newspaper sources, demonstrated the prevalent discussion surrounding the Football League Cup and, consequently, the need for academic investigation.

During this investigation, the author for each newspaper article (in fact, all other texts) was examined because some journalists may have been more in favour of the League Cup than others. It might be argued that a journalist is likely to be too involved and would thus provide a ‘we’ perspective (Bloyce, 2004) and therefore is likely to be an evident bias within the text. For this reason, we should not accept claims made by journalists (or anyone, for that matter) uncritically, because as sociologists it is important to appreciate

[9] Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday; Daily Mirror and Mirror on Sunday; Daily Telegraph and Sunday Telegraph; Express and Express on Sunday; Financial Times; Guardian; Independent and Independent on Sunday; News of the World; Observer; The Sun; Times and Sunday Times.

that many of the claims made by journalists are highly involved and have 'the effect of hindering, rather than helping, the development of a more adequate understanding' (Waddington, 2000, p.4) of the dynamic relationship between the Football League and FA. When researching the main body of this thesis - the relationship between the Football League and FA – research was conducted at the FA headquarters, and documentary analysis of the FA minutes took place.

Primarily, FA minutes chosen for exploration were 1959, 1960 and 1961 (again, around the time of the Football League Cup inception) but, the FA minutes between 1959 and 1961 did not reveal anything substantial regarding the relationship between the Football League and FA. Nor was there any commentary regarding the Football League Cup. However, the omission of any detail regarding the League Cup tournament would suggest that the FA had no inclination towards the competition and was therefore, in fact, very revealing. In this regard, May writes that documents 'may be interesting for what they leave out, as well as what they contain' (2003, p.183). Also, FA minutes were used to investigate the Football Association's accounts. These data were collected to investigate the idea that the Football League Cup was inaugurated for economic reasons. The financial records were detailed and, as this investigation was not examining the economics of the FA only selected data were extracted; total net profit (from balance sheet) and net profit from the FA Cup - figures were taken for each year between 1947 and 1960. The 1947 campaign was a particularly successful season and first league competition to commence following World War Two and, for this reason, was deemed to

be a good starting point. Data were collated for each subsequent year up to 1960 when the Football League Cup began.

Also, I was able to utilize the expertise of the FA Statistician and Historian, David Barber, through personal communication (email, telephone and in person). Also, of course, I had access to a wide range of literature held at the FA library which proved useful for reviewing current literature surrounding the research question and, in addition, allowed me to contextualize the development of the differing football authorities mentioned throughout this investigation.

Having outlined the chosen methodological approach, this dissertation will now move on to discuss the findings – beginning with a detailed, processual account of the development and advent of the Football League Cup and, importantly, how the competition was used in an attempt to impact on the extended power afforded to the Football Association at the time.

6. The Advent of the Football League Cup

This thesis will attempt to examine the dynamic relationship between the Football League and Football Association from 1960 to present day. I begin the examination from 1960 because this was when the Football League Cup was inaugurated and, more importantly, as I later argue, a part reason for the competitions advent was to challenge the other domestic cup competition in England, the FA Cup and, more specifically, the FA as an organisation. Primarily this chapter will contextualise the investigation by providing a history of the League Cup's advent.

The Football League Cup was said to be the inspiration of Alan Hardaker (Secretary of the Football League from 1957 – 1979). Sociologically however, this explanation would seem rather mono-causal in nature. Perhaps a more sociologically adequate explanation would view the advent of the Football League Cup as a consequence of a number of individuals working together. Indeed, Hardaker did not work 'alone' as he was a member of a committee; therefore, the decision to introduce the competition would have been influenced by a number of different factors[10]. Nevertheless, Hardaker was the public voice of the committee, which may have lead to his over-inflated position according to commentators at the time. There is little literature regarding Hardaker's role within the Football League although Graham Kelly, who worked for Hardaker at the Football League between 1968 and 1979, and was his assistant from 1973 to 1979, does provide us with a brief account of Hardaker's history as secretary of the Football League:

[10] Strictly speaking, 'factors' is not a favourable term amongst figurational sociologists as it is a very 'one-dimensional' expression. However, a more appropriate term such as 'interdependencies' would have not worked in the sentence as it is structured.

> Hardaker was a man not to be trifled with. He had seen active service in the Royal Navy and rejoiced in a ferocious reputation as one who 'took no prisoners'. He ran the Football League pretty much as his personal fiefdom, brooking little interference from committees, directors, or, least of all, managers (*The Independent*, 5 August 2002).

Furthermore, Kelly describes Hardaker as the 'autocratic Secretary of the Football League' (*The Independent*, 6 March 2000).

Hardaker attempted to introduce major plans for reform to the Football League in 1960, however, before we continue, it is necessary to contextualise these developments by describing the then current structure of the League. The season 1959 – 1960 consisted of four divisions with twenty-two teams in Divisions One and Two and twenty-four teams in Divisions Three and Four with two-up and two-down promotion and relegation (Football League, 2004). Hardaker proposed to reconstruct the league ('Pattern of Reform') in to four divisions of twenty with four up and four down promotion and relegation (Football League, 2004). A new midweek cup competition was then suggested, by Hardaker, to replace the revenue lost by playing fewer league games, in this case, from 42 to 38 games for those in Divisions One and Two and from 46 to 38 for those in Divisions Three and Four. Hardaker also suggested other reforms. For instance, following the introduction of the Copyright Act (1956) it was proposed, by Hardaker, that the lists

of League fixtures published each year should be subject to copyright for use by those such as football pools promoters. In 1959 the League successfully sued Littlewoods Pools, meaning that all Pools companies would now have to pay for the privilege of printing fixtures in their coupons (*Guardian*, 21 December 2005, p.6).

Although the league formation remained the same, the cup competition was kept and the Football League Cup was established. Here, it is important to highlight that Hardaker's limited success represents the limited power Hardaker had as a 'figurehead'. It has been suggested that the fundamental reason for the introduction of the League Cup was due to the predicted beneficiaries it would have on the 'lesser teams' in the league (Carling, n.d), particularly, during a time when the number of spectators were decreasing considerably, most notably, within those clubs who were not a part of the elite Division One. The cup would be based on two legged, home and away ties to help smaller clubs make money (Football League, 2004) as the competition would be more financially attractive to lower league clubs, as opposed to the FA Cup where a small club could go several seasons without benefiting from a money spinning tie (Carling, n.d). The organisers of the League Cup suggested that the competition would help reverse the clubs' financial difficulties as the tournament would mean more games, and in turn, more spectators, and, ultimately, money through the turnstiles. It would now be appropriate to trace the popularity of football (from the post-war era to the advent of the League Cup),

through the medium of attendance figures, to contextualise[11] the position of English professional football, prior to the advent of the Football League Cup.

The post-war era (1945 – 1950) witnessed the popularity of English professional football reach its highest in recent history, which in turn, lead to the game's improved economic status. Attendances peaked during the 1948-49 season (41 million fans) with as many as 30 000 fans often being locked out due to over-capacity (Foster, 2003). Walvin explains why football was so popular during this era - 'it is easy to see why the game seemed so attractive…as the nation tried to shrug off its wartime restraints and drabness and return to the pleasure and pursuits familiar in more peaceful times' (1986, p.10). Furthermore, during the improving economic circumstances of post-war Britain, Murray suggests that, 'young and adult males…found in soccer a cheap and exciting way to pass their free time' (1996, p.88). However, following the immediate post-war period, football attendances began to decline steadily during the 1950s and 60s. In fact, Szymanski and Kuypers state that 'between the late 1940s and the late 1980s football lost over half its spectators' (2000, p.46). Undoubtedly, lower attendances would have affected clubs financially, particularly in the lower divisions. A partial explanation for this decline can be attributed towards a 'popular shift in general leisure interests and an overall transformation in popular cultural habits amongst the British people' (Walvin, 1986, p.12-13), resulting from a general increase in affluence through the 1950s and 1960s. As Pollard notes 'In the United Kingdom [in the 1950s/1960s], as elsewhere in the west, the rate of saving, the level of investment in scientific research and development, and the rate

[11] I am aware that other measurements would be appropriate to trace the popularity of English professional football. However, in an attempt to be concise, and not divert from the research question, English professional football attendance figures will be used.

of application of technical progress were very high in comparison with any earlier period of history and in consequence there was a faster rate of economic growth than perhaps in any previous age' (1992, p.229). In this regard May states that 'over the twenty five years from 1948 to 1973, growth was faster than at any previous period of equal length in British history' (1987, p.447). As Inglis notes, Britain 'never had it so good' (1988, p.230)[12]. Consequently, the economic boom resulted in the British public having more money to spend on other popular emerging leisure opportunities at the time which, in turn, to some degree, would have diverted attention away from the football stadia. There is no research to suggest there is a correlation between an increase in leisure opportunities and decrease in football attendances however, I suggest, the relationship is plausible. In this regard, Walvin states, 'there [were], quite simply, many more (and for some people, more attractive) spare time alternatives to the local football ground' (1986, p.12-13). Alternatives included music, fashion and cinema.

There was an emergence in popular music in Britain during the mid 1950s, specifically, rock 'n' roll. As Street notes, 'Rock 'n' roll did constitute an important new addition to youth entertainment' (1994, p.463). Moreover and, in part, the emerging popular music scene was a catalyst towards the rising youth culture in Britain. In this regard, Street states that 'youth culture announced itself most noisily with the advent of rock 'n' roll (1994, p.462). Furthermore, the 1950s witnessed a growth in the fashion industry and, consequently, led to the emergence of such sub-cultures as 'punks' and 'Teddy Boys' (Street, 1994). Indeed, this was a period where the British youth were socialising more (outside the football grounds), as Street quotes, 'a pound would buy a bloody good night

[12] However, Britain's economic boom 'lagged behind its European competitors' (Murphy, 2000, p.341).

out. You could have eight or nine pints and twenty fags and a couple of tanners for the duke box' (1994, p.463). What's more, such a lifestyle was depicted at the cinema which, subsequently, led to the rise of 'teen movies' and as such, resulted in an increase in people visiting the movies. Simply stated, a rise in popular pastimes such as listening to new forms of music, socialising, and going to the cinema, in part, would have contributed to the decline in popularity of English professional football (as people now had different, new and emerging alternatives to football) and, in turn, a reluctance to watch live football during the late 1950s and 60s.

Nevertheless, the declining popularity of football, with particular reference from the 1960s, cannot be attributed solely to the increase in available leisure opportunities to the British public. For instance, the supposed increase in hooliganism at football matches, during the 1960s, may have diverted fans away from the turnstiles (although soccer hooliganism was prevalent before the 1960s[13]). In this regard, 'from the late 1960s until the middle of 1990, the year of the world Cup Finals in Italy, soccer hooliganism was routinely regarded as one of England's major social problems' (Dunning, 1999, p.132). What's more, following the advent of ITV (Independent Television) in the 1950s, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reinforced 'its claim of "BBC for sport" by signing up key sports' (Whannel, 2002, P.292). Sport, including football, during the 1950s was already a part of the BBC's schedule. For instance, in 1954, the BBC broadcast the Football World Cup held in Switzerland (Williams, 2004). By 1962, 'sport formed more than a fifth of all BBC television and fifteen percent of ITV broadcasting'

[13] Dunning, E., Murphy, P., & Williams, J. (1986). Spectator violence at football matches: Towards a sociological explanation. British Journal of Sociology, 37, (2), 221 – 224.

(Williams, 2004, p.205). Also, the number of people with television sets increased dramatically over a twenty year period. For instance, in 1946, only a 'tiny minority of the [British] population had access to television' (Williams, 2004, p.1). However, by 1951, there were one million television sets across the United Kingdom, with the number increasing to thirteen million by 1964 (May, 1987). With sport, particularly football, being a prominent feature of television programming during the 1950s and 60s, coupled with an increase in homes with television sets, perhaps to some extent there was a tendency to watch football games at home rather than going to the stadia. To summarise, the popular shift in leisure interest, increase in hooliganism and an increase in sport coverage on TV, all contributed, in part, to the reduction in spectators from the 1950s onwards. Because gate receipts, during this period, was the primary source of income for clubs (as commercialisation was not as prevalent), lower league clubs, and indeed, football on the whole was in need of financial assistance.

Considering the aforementioned, it seems strange that another competition was being considered at a time when less people were watching football. Yes the idea would generate speculation but would more people watch games? This makes the idea to introduce another domestic cup competition even more illogical and, arguably, success for the Football League Cup would be harder to achieve. Nevertheless, the League Cup idea was backed by a number of professionals working for the Football League (unsurprising considering it was a Football League initiative). Joe Richards, President of the Football League at the time stated that 'it should be remembered that despite much criticism, the Football League Cup has proved to be a useful money spinner to the smaller

clubs' (*The Times*, 24 July 1961). The 1960s was the period in which the 'deteriorating financial position of many professional clubs reached crisis point' (Houlihan, 1991, p.132) and, as mentioned, a partial explanation for the advent of the Football League Cup was to help establish financial stability. However, in order to more fully understand why the competition was introduced it is necessary to focus 'in the round' (Goudsblom, 1977; Maguire, 1991; Maguire, 1992); coupled with the perceived financial benefits to lower league clubs, it could be suggested, partly, that the organisation of the Football League Cup was to challenge the Football Association's position in administration.

As a consequence of reduced gate receipts the FA, in turn, would suffer. Part of the Football Association's finance would come from attendance revenue and, therefore, during the mid 1950s to 1960s, when attendances were low, the organisations profits would decline. Evidence from the FA accounts shows an increase in net revenue from the 1947–1948 campaign through subsequent seasons up until 1952-1953 – here, the figures begin to fluctuate and, ultimately, decline (until 1955-1956)[14]. It could be argued that the Football League recognised the Football Association's weakness, financially, and decided to challenge the FA during a period of uncertainty for the 'leading' football governing body. One could argue that the advent of the Football League Cup was to challenge the Football Association's domestic knock-out competition, the FA Cup[15]. In this regard, Inglis asked 'was it going to be just a poorer version of the FA Cup or even worse, an attempt to displace it?' (1988, p.216). Further still, it would appear that the

[14] See appendix.
[15] Although, by the time the League Cup was inaugurated (1960), the FA's net income had started to rise once more. Nevertheless, the idea of introducing a Football League Cup would have occurred prior to 1960 during the period whereby the FA was not at their strongest financially (mid 1950s).

introduction of the tournament in 1960 was a stepping stone to further reform, in an attempt to strengthen the Football League's position within the formal administrative hierarchy. For Alan Hardaker (Secretary of the Football League), 'the greater issue was, in his opinion, the complete reorganization of the League' (Inglis, 1988, p.215). Football League representatives were of course aware of the friction such an introduction could cause (although highly likely not concerned), as Joe Richards (President of the Football League) notes, 'I hope the press will not immediately assume that the League is going to fall out with the FA, or anybody else' (Inglis, 1988, p.215). In fact, Richards 'assured the clubs that relations with the FA were harmonious' (Inglis, 1988, p.215) which, of course, was far from the truth. Therefore, one could argue that the formation of the League Cup competition was not merely to assist lower league clubs financially but was a broader expression for power.

It is at this juncture of the investigation where the foci divert from an examination of the Football League Cup to an examination in to the dynamic power relationship between the two governing bodies for football in England; the Football Association and the Football League. Moreover, this focus will be central to the entire analysis.

It is necessary to highlight that the FA were responsible for organising, arguably, the biggest and most famous domestic cup competition in the world; The Challenge Cup, or better known today, the FA Cup. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, the Football Association, formally speaking, are at the top of the administrative hierarchy (Houlihan, 1991). With the above in mind, maybe, to some extent, it could be argued that

the organisation of the Football League Cup was to challenge the Football Association's position in administration. Undoubtedly, there have been a number of discrepancies between the Football Association and Football League as to who is the 'premier' governing authority for football. The advent of the Football League Cup, perhaps, could be an example of a challenge to the Football Association's authority.

Rivalries between organisations and institutions in sport are by no means a modern phenomenon. An example of such a conflict can be given by highlighting the conflict between Eton and Rugby public schools. Eton considered themselves to be the 'leading public school in all respects' (Dunning, Malcolm and Waddington, 2004, p.45) who were then surprised to hear that Rugby had developed a distinctive way of playing football. It could be suggested, to some degree, that Eton, in return, developed a 'form of football that was equally distinctive but in key respects diametrically opposite to the game of Rugby' (Dunning, Malcolm and Waddington, 2004, p.45) with a game that used feet instead of hands, in an attempt to 'see off' this challenge to Eton's status as the leading public school in all respects.

This chapter has contextualised the Football League Cup and, moreover, highlighted, sociologically, possible reasons for the advent of the competition. Although the literature would suggest that the introduction of the League Cup was to assist lower league clubs financially, one must asses other figurations involved and improve our understanding and conceptualization by researching 'in the round' (Goudsblom, 1977; Maguire, 1991; Maguire, 1992). Indeed, the Football League Cup was (and is) financially beneficial to a

number of clubs in Britain, as highlighted above; however, further investigation is essential for a greater understanding as to why the League Cup was introduced. English Football is the only sport to have two governing bodies who oversee the same clubs (except those in the English Premier League, whereby the Football League has very limited say). However, both organisations adopt different agendas and have different responsibilities and, for this reason, undoubtedly, friction between the two associations was, and, still is prevalent. Therefore, it could be argued to some degree that the Football League Cup was introduced as an 'object' to challenge the FA's position as the number one administrative body in professional football, formally speaking. In an attempt to conceptualise the dynamic relationship between the two governing bodies for football in England, the Football Association and Football League and, later, the European football governing body UEFA and, of course, world football governing body FIFA, this thesis will investigate the phenomena periodically, beginning with the period 1960 – 1970.

7. 1960 – 1970: Impact of the Football League Cup

The Football League Cup will be used as a platform in an attempt to investigate, processually, the effect it had on the power-balance ratio between the two domestic governing bodies for football in England; the Football League and the Football Association. This chapter will examine the status of the Football League Cup through its first decade (1960 – 1970). Investigating periodically makes the examination easier to read, however, I would like to make it clear, from the outset, that one must not conceptualise the relationship between the Football League and Football Association and, indeed, other football governing bodies for world and continental football, in 'stages'. In this regard, Mennell states, 'any attempt to separate out one strand as the "first cause", or to represent history as a sequence of static "stages", distorts the essentially processual character of social reality' (1998, p.70). Of course, events do not occur 'one after the other' but, rather, parallel or inter-woven with each another.

It could be argued, that during its early years, the Football League Cup struggled to establish itself. A headline in *The Times* reads 'nothing new in league cup: football innovation leads nowhere' (30 May 1960, p.40). The article also lists a number of supposedly unattractive fixtures between Division One and lower league clubs, such as, Arsenal v Accrington Stanley, Tottenham Hotspur v Torquay United and Wolverhampton Wanderers v Wrexham and concludes, 'even excitement will be missing, for the FA Cup already supplies that' (*The Times*, 30 May 1960, p.4). However, this statement is somewhat sweeping and would depend entirely. Firstly, the above fixtures are only

‘unattractive’ to some of the elite clubs fans, whereas for some fans of lower league clubs, a fixture against one of the country’s best teams would seem very ‘attractive’ as it would provide an opportunity for fans of ‘lesser’ teams to see the country’s best footballers in action against their local team (somewhat of a rarity). Also, those employed within ‘big’ clubs (whose jobs, for the most part, depends on results) would find a fixture against a lower league team ‘very attractive’ and, of course, those employed within ‘lesser’ teams may relish the opportunity to play a ‘bigger’ club and, again, find the fixture ‘very attractive’. Perhaps the above article is merely suggesting that the mentioned fixtures would be ‘unattractive’ to the ‘neutral’ fan of football. Secondly, such draws are also likely in the FA Cup, however, various newspaper articles seem to omit this point, perhaps suggesting that there was initial prejudice towards the Football League Cup. Moreover, the Football Association had not been threatened to be overturned as the leading governing body for football by the introduction of another domestic cup competition and would appear, still, domestically, to head the football hierarchy immediately after the League Cup’s advent. Coupled with journalists a number of clubs were critical of the new cup competition. The Football League state that Division One clubs did not share the committee’s plan for money generation and several opted not to partake in the early years. Wolverhampton Wanderers chairman, Mr J. S. Baker, criticised the Football League Cup, explaining that the competition was:

> Not in the interest of the game, nor of the football-going public of the Wolverhampton district, who were used to seeing, and entitled to get, only the best possible type of football. The directors, he said, did

> not feel that the games against the same type of clubs week after week could possibly make for better football (*The Times*, 29 July 1960, p.3).

One could argue that a partial consequence to this negativity and bad publicity led to poor attendances. In fact, for League Cup games, average crowds were only slightly higher than those for Third Division games (Football League, 2004). The 1961-62 competition again failed to catch the imagination (Football League, 2004) as the League Cup still struggled to establish itself as a major influence on the football calendar. Here I will attempt to explain the competitions apparent difficulties during the early years by examining the broader social processes occurring at the time of the League Cup's introduction.

As mentioned briefly, a number of Division One clubs initially opted not to take part in the competition. The 1960-61 campaign saw Arsenal, Spurs [Tottenham Hotspur], Wolves [Wolverhampton Wonderers], West Bromwich Albion, and Sheffield Wednesday all declined to enter the 1960-61 League Cup competition (*The Times*, 24 January 1962, p.4). Their feelings were further reflected, during the 1961-62 season by Burnley, Manchester United, Everton, Liverpool and Chelsea who also withdrew along with the clubs from the 1960-61 campaign (*The Times*, 24 January 1962, p.4). The abovementioned represented a then powerful group of most of the wealthier clubs in the League and is self-evidently the case that these clubs regarded the tournament as having insufficient status and not sufficiently remunerative. Therefore, the clubs unwillingness to

participate would have belittled the League Cup Competition and, in turn, the Football League as a whole.

Also, another factor that hindered the success of the League Cup was the introduction of the European Cup, which was established just five years earlier (1955). Over time, it could be argued that a number of unintended consequences have evolved during the contemporary years of English football, for the top clubs, such as fixture congestion, as more opportunities occur for a chance to play in Europe. This issue will be discussed in more detail as we move to the latter stages of this investigation. This is not to say that the introduction of the European Cup did not have an effect on the League Cup at all throughout the early years; actually, the contrary. The European Cup was seen as the pinnacle prize in club football competition as it offered the title 'best in Europe' and therefore generated a lot of public interest (from journalists, TV representatives, fans and lay people). In comparison, the League Cup offered 'nothing new' or 'anything to play for' but pride (*The Times*, 30 May 1960, p.6). Importantly, the advent of the European cup was one expression of the increasing concentration of the resources available to football. In fact, the European Cup represents the skewed distribution of football income in favour of the larger clubs and, importantly, the competition gave the audience a more attractive and glamorous fixtures to watch. As such, Inglis suggests that 'fans were not deserting the game so much as becoming selective about which games they went to see' (1988, p.241). European games, like League Cup matches were played midweek. For the 'neutral' fan, one could suggest, that given a choice, a European club fixture would be more desirable to watch. Furthermore, journalists now had two cup competitions to report

and, unsurprisingly, coverage of League Cup matches and European fixtures were not divided equally. This clearly represents the League Cup's secondary position to the European Cup – although, strictly speaking its position was tertiary in that it also preceded the FA Cup. Also, during the mid 1960s English elite clubs had particular success in European competitions with West Ham winning the European Cup Winners Cup (introduced in 1960 and, again, would have over-shadowed the League Cup's inception) in 1965 and reaching the semi-finals in 1966 whilst Liverpool were the beaten finalists during the same campaign. The success of English teams, arguably, diverted attention away from other League fixtures and, more importantly, the advent of the European Cup would undermine the interest in Football League Competitions, which arguably de-valued the Football Leagues status and helped bolster the position of the FA as English Football's leading authority. In this regard, Hardaker (Chairman of the Football League at the time) was concerned 'that under the existing system, the public was beginning to regard League fixtures as secondary to European competitions' (Inglis, 1988, p.230). However, to attribute the competition's initial downfall to elite clubs boycotting the tournament would be too simplistic. Coupled with the above, the League Cup competition conflicted with FA agendas, most notably, their international fixtures and, as such, resulted in scepticism from both journalists and lay people and, more importantly, heightened tensions between the Football League and Football Association at the time.

It could be argued that the possible collision in fixtures between League Cup matches and International fixtures contributed, in part, to the competition's initial low prestige. A

number of journalists were concerned that the strength of the national team would be threatened when International and League Cup matches clashed (*The Times*, 31 December 1971, p.6). International fixtures, like League Cup matches, were played mid week. To expand on this point, for example, if a player who represented the England national team opted to play in a crucial League Cup fixture when he could be playing for his country it would, on paper, weaken the strength of the national squad. One could question the relevance of such an argument considering that a majority of the English national team played for the elite clubs who initially boycotted the competition. However, not all players would have played for the 'big' clubs and, the elite teams were only absent for the opening two seasons. Furthermore, club representatives may have pressured players not to participate in international matches as there was the likelihood that 'their' player may get injured or become lethargic for upcoming domestic fixtures (which is becoming more common with the contemporary game). Having said this, there were players who made the 'heinous sin of refusing to play for their country' (Inglis, 1988, p.261). Alan Hudson (Chelsea) and Colin Todd (Derby) refused to play for England because of exhaustion during the 70s. While the advent of the Football League Cup cannot be solely attributed to player fatigue, participation in the newly inaugurated competition, alongside involvement in the FA Cup, European Cup and League fixtures would have contributed to player tiredness. More importantly, and specific to this investigation, one should highlight that the FA were, and still are, responsible for the England national team and, of course, the Football League were responsible for the League Cup Competition, therefore, conflict between the two authorities heightened during this time. The FA would not want national representatives to get injured during a

League Cup fixture, or (although highly unlikely) choose to represent club over country by partaking in a League Cup game over national duty. In fact, the FA had introduced legislation making it a 'breech of [the] rules' (Green, 1952, p.398) not to participate in a competition (domestic or international) organised by the Football Association:

> 'Any player selected to play in any international or other match arranged by this Association at the annual conference and (without good and sufficient cause) failing to play in such a match, may be adjudged by the Council to have been guilty of misconduct, and any club who may be deemed to have encouraged or instigated such a player to commit such breach of rules shall be deemed guilty of a similar offence' (Green, 1952, p.398).

This is an example of the limited cooperation between the two governing bodies, at the time, in that they were keen to protect their own interests rather than to collaborate to improve the status of football across England. Moreover, it shows the extended power that the FA had over the Football League in that the Football League accepted the above legislation without challenge. Indeed, the Football League, if they wished, could not impose a similar piece of legislation and thus represents the organisations limited power at the time.

After the difficulties of the opening two campaigns, the Football League Cup went through a period of revival. Between 1962 and 1970 several key developments occurred

which contributed to the recovery of the competition. Firstly, between 1962 and 1965 a number of First Division clubs who were originally sceptical of the Football League Cup idea became involved including, Birmingham City, Leicester City and Chelsea. Moreover, an amendment to the tournament would see interest grow from more Division One clubs. The 1966 final between West Bromwich Albion and West Ham was the last of the two-legged finals (Football League, 2004). This modification allowed for a neutral setting for subsequent finals. From 1967 onwards, Wembley was to host the final and provided the League Cup with some added glamour and prestige. One would assume that the FA was involved with this process but, in fact, Brian Barber (FA Historian and Statistician) states that this is highly unlikely as Wembley was not owned by the FA but, rather, it was property of the London Council and would therefore not look to the FA for permission to use it (personal communication, September 14, 2004). The final now being played at Wembley was just one modification that changed the 'big clubs' view of the tournament; the second was the path to Europe. In an attempt to increase the League Cup's popularity further, Hardaker had lobbied UEFA, and even threatened to boycott the fairs cup, to earn the winners of the competition an automatic place in Europe (Football League, 2004). For the first time, there was a second opportunity for clubs to gain entry in to the European Cup; an amendment that arguably, revived the position of the League Cup and, crucially, would suggest, at this time, the Football League carried a more powerful negotiating clout than it does now.

One could argue that the advent of the Football League Cup had little effect on the power balance ratio between the Football League and Football Association. In fact, it could be

suggested that the introduction of the competition, especially during its early years, hindered the Football League's status in that some journalists, fans and members of various (elite) football clubs viewed the tournament as 'pointless'. However, during the late 60s a number of developments occurred that increased the Football Leagues power chances, including: an increase in interest from a number of Division One clubs, Wembley becoming the new venue for League Cup finals and entry in to Europe for the winners; the latter being fundamental to this investigation. The advent of the Football League Cup allowed for greater negotiating and, actually, was used as a tool to shift the balance of power, albeit slightly, toward the Football League. The interdependencies between the Football League and continental football governing bodies become clearer; the Football League relied on UEFA for a European Cup place for winners of the League Cup and UEFA were dependant on the Football League for a participating team for the Fairs Cup. With this in mind, I would argue that, for the Football League, the inauguration of the League Cup was, in actual fact, far from 'pointless'. Investigating the Football League Cup sociologically has unearthed the fluctuating relationship between the Football League and other governing bodies, both domestically and internationally. This investigation will now continue to investigate the dynamic inter-changing power relationships between the different football governing bodies with little reference to the Football League Cup. This examination will now pay particular reference to the period 1970 – 1980.

8. 1970 – 1980: Tensions Run High

The period 1970 – 1980 witnessed an increase in conflict between the Football League and Football Association, in fact, as Inglis notes, 'from the mid 1960s onwards there were some particularly serious rifts [between the Football League and FA]' (1988, p.259). The disputes were wide ranging but, ultimately, the biggest disagreement during this period was regarding the distribution of revenue.

In 1970, the FA was challenged when Stoke City made an attempt to reduce the FA's power as a disciplinary body. Around this time, other clubs were also keen to change the rules over allocation of FA cup final tickets; an issue which exists today – to give recent examples, in 2004, Millwall were allocated just 22 400 tickets for their FA Cup final against Manchester United who, incidentally, were allocated 40 000 tickets (The Independent, 2004) and, Chelsea made public their disproval over the allocation of 25 000 tickets for the 2007 FA Cup final (BBC, 2007c) which, subsequently, resulted in a 'cup ticketing review' (BBC, 2007d). However, a more pressing issue for Football League clubs was the way in which revenue generated (by the FA Cup pools[16] and the use of Cup fixtures) was not redistributed justly to League members. Of course, without the participation of Football League clubs 'The Pools' would not have been possible – for this reason, League clubs demanded more income. In February 1972, 91 of the 92 Football League clubs were represented at a meeting with Football Association officials to request 'direct control of the FA Cup pool and sought a percentage of all income

[16]Football Pools (or 'The Pools') are games whereby people attempt to predict the outcomes of top-flight football matches. The price of entry would be fixed with a percentage of the revenue going to the FA.

derived by the FA directly, or indirectly, from League clubs, and their use of League players (*The Times*, 14 April 1972, p.8). Here, it is interesting to note that there is no reference to Football League officials attending the meeting, just members from the associated League Clubs. Perhaps the Football League committee was skeptical about confronting the Football Association in fear that they would antagonise their relationship further and, additionally, did not wish to jeopardise the financial agreement already in place. It is conceivably, for this reason, that the League voiced their disproval over financial arrangements, indirectly, through Football League club associates and, also, through their official publication – the Football League Review. The very fact that the FA were, and still are, responsible for finance represents their inflated position as a governing authority for football. Of further interest, *The Times* notes how Dr Andrew Stephen (FA Chairman) was absent from the meeting and was 'attending another meeting at the Football Association headquarters' (14 April 1972, p.8). This clearly demonstrates the poor attitude shown towards the Football League (by certain FA associates) and, would suggest that some FA committee members did not view the Football League as a sufficient threat to the Football Association's position in power. However, the FA were by no means 'all powerful' and, as mentioned earlier, without League Clubs participation 'The Pools' would not exist nor could the FA Cup continue (as League clubs made up a large proportion of entries). If Football League clubs boycotted the FA Cup then, obviously, the FA Cup Pools would not go on. Therefore the Football League had more negotiating clout, and power, than perhaps those involved with the FA perceived. Tensions continued to mount between the Football League and FA during negotiations for the live broadcast of England verses West Germany in 1972.

There existed, for the negotiation of fees for live television transmission of professional football games, the 'Joint FA and League Television Committee'. It was agreed, by the committee, that Alan Hardaker (Football League Secretary at the Time) would ask for £100 000 as he was 'the most experienced negotiator in all such matters' (Inglis, 1988, p.260). However, without notice, FA members ordered Hardaker not to speak and Andrew Stephen asked for £60 000 instead. This act of 'initiative' represents the FA's premier position as a domestic football governing body at the time and, more importantly, was the first time that the FA would assert their power at the expense of embarrassing the Football League. Rather than being 'cunning' or 'strategic', this was, for the first time, a clear and blatant attempt by the FA to antagonise the Football League by asserting their extended power and overruling, without discussion, a 'joint' decision. In addition, undoubtedly, Stephen would understand that agreeing a lower fee would be more detrimental to the Football League than the FA in that the Football League were more financially dependent on such income. By agreeing a fee of £40 000 less, the FA reduced (by nearly 50% on this occasion) the Football League's financial influence and, as a result, would hinder the League's power chances. Indeed, this event was a turning point for relations between the FA and Football League. Before now, discontent between the two organisations was simmering but, with an obvious display of resentment by the FA towards the Football League, the battle for power of governance for domestic football would, without a doubt, amplify.

As a knee-jerk reaction to the above events, there was certainly a possibility that the Football League would demand affiliated clubs to boycott the FA Cup and/or insist on a

fee from the FA for using League players for international matches. In this regard, Inglis notes that 'there were certainly plenty of club chairman urging punitive sanctions' (1988, p.260). In fact, the relationship between the Football League and FA at this time was so bad, Inglis suggests that the Football League would 'break away' (1998, p.260). Although the Football Association was responsible for issues such as finance and player discipline it would be blinkered to believe that the FA was the definitive power for the governance of domestic football in England. By highlighting possible consequences to the FA's actions, it becomes clearer how interdependent the FA and Football League were (and still are) which demonstrates the extended power chances that the Football League actually had. The FA's dependence on the Football League soon became apparent and relations were calmed when an agreement was reached in December 1972 with the 'Lang Agreement'[17] (Inglis, 1988, p.260) – surely, if the FA did not recognise the Football League's limited power then the organisation would not have distributed more income to the League. Another issue that would create further tension between the Football League and FA during the 70s was commercialisation.

Many writers have discussed the effect of commercialisation on the game of football (Conn, 1997 & 1999; Slack, 2004) but, there remains two issues: firstly, the majority of texts analyse the impact of commercialisation on the fans - even though the impact is far greater and, in relation to this investigation, the commercialisation of football has heightened tensions between the FA and Football League. Secondly, commercialisation is often investigated as a contemporary issue but, is an issue that can be traced back to as

[17] Following the 'Lang Agreement', a greater share of the income generated by international matches was given to the League and, it was agreed, that the pools income would be paid to the League as soon as it was received by the FA (so they could earn on the interest).

early as the 70s. Since the advent of sponsored competitions such as the Watney Mann Invitation Cup (1970 – 1973), the Texaco cup (1970 – 1975) and the Ford Sporting League (1970 – 1971) there have been discrepancies between the Football League and Football Association as to how the revenue should be divided. To give an example, during the 70s, tentative offers were made by an oil company to pay £35 000 for the use of FA Cup winners badges. The FA argued that the League should not receive monies from badges issued for two non-league clubs who had once won the FA Cup as they were not affiliated to the League (Inglis 1988).

It is unsurprising that such an issue would be the cause of friction between the two governing authorities as the FA was inaugurated out of ideas such as 'amateurism' and 'muscular Christianity' whereas the Football League was created on the premise of 'professionalism'. However, the argument, for the most part, isn't whether sponsorship is 'good or 'bad' for football but, rather, how much is each football governing body going to receive? Undoubtedly, financial strength is a strong (not only) indicator as to how 'powerful' an organisation is. For this reason, commercialisation was arguably a tactic used by the Football League, partly, to generate finance for their battle to supersede the FA as the leading governing body for domestic football. Indeed, the aforementioned tournaments generated increased income for the League: Ford Motors, sponsors of the Ford Sporting League, spent £30 000 on advertisements in the Football League Review (Inglis, 1988); the Football League and FA shared £50 000 sponsorship from Watney Mann Brewery who sponsored the Watney Mann Invitation Cup (Inglis, 1988) and, received income from the BBC (amount unknown) for the privilege of televising the

tournament; finally, the League would have undoubtedly received revenue from the American petroleum company, Texaco, who were sponsors of the Texaco Cup.

Nevertheless, there remain two issues with the tactic to generate an increase in revenue through the use of sponsorship. Firstly, as highlighted briefly in the previous paragraph, the FA would receive a percentage of any sponsorship and, therefore, the Football Association were benefiting, financially, without being responsible for the administration of the tournaments concerned. Secondly, the FA, by 1960, were already earning over £110 000 from FA Cup revenue[18] alone which would suggest (given the gulf between the Football League and FA in terms of finance), that sponsorship, as a strategy used by the Football League to increase revenue and, consequently, power chances, was a tactic unlikely to have any real effect. For these reasons, sponsorship did little in the way of disturbing the balance of power between the FA and Football League and, if anything, favored the Football Association in that the organisation were receiving extra proceeds for doing, effectively, 'nothing'. For the Football League, there were several other factors that prevented a shift in power during the 1970s. Perhaps most detrimental was the increased friction with affiliated League clubs and internal affairs, particularly, the battle for League presidency between Bob Lord and Lord Westwood.

The 1974 election for Football League president caused much unrest with the League committee because an unpopular character, with many, was going for post – Bob Lord. In this regard, Inglis states, 'no individual had caused the Management Committee more trouble than Bob Lord' (1988, p.267). Lord was familiar for using abusive language,

[18] See appendix.

being outspoken and even, on some occasions racist; Inglis describes him as a ‘dictator and trouble maker’ (1988, p.268). It would not be unconceivable to suggest, for this reason, that much of the Management Committee’s time was spent trying to oust Bob Lord’s challenge for presidency, rather than, challenging its rival authority, the FA, for power. Also, the mid 1970s witnessed a problem with the relationship between the League and its associated member clubs. For instance, midland clubs felt as though decisions were being made by the Football League without consultation. For sure, the League was not going to increase the status of their organisation without the support of affiliated clubs; again, this issue was of more importance than the challenge for extended power of governance for domestic football. As Inglis notes, this unveiled a ‘communications problem’ (1988, p.273) between the League and member clubs and, importantly, would suggest that their inability to perform the simplest of tasks (communicate) would limit their chances of superseding the FA as the leading authority for domestic football in England. By the late 1970s, the Football League was in liaison, more than ever, with the Professional Footballers’ Association (PFA) and, again, would divert the League from making any deliberate attempt to supersede the FA.

The PFA is the union for professional footballers’ that look to ‘protect, improve and negotiate the conditions, rights and status of all professional players by collective bargaining agreements’ (PFA, 2008). The Football League Management Committee were in negotiations with the PFA over the freedom of contract between 1974 and 1978 and, in this regard, Inglis describes negotiations as ‘long and tortuous’ (1988, p.279). Although a detailed analysis between the Football League and Players’ union is not needed, it is

necessary to highlight the League's preoccupation with such a matter as it would have undoubtedly affected the Leagues position to negotiate with the FA, or even challenge the organisation, for a better football governing stance. Again, we see how the League had to deal with more pressing issues other than the conflict for increased power chances against the FA. It would now be appropriate to conclude.

In conclusion, during the 1970s, the above mentioned would suggest that there was little movement (if any) in the balance of power between the Football League and Football Association. The Football League was preoccupied with more pressing issues than to concentrate their time and resources on superseding the FA. Most notably, the following is highlighted: unrest within the Management Committee, with reference to the unruly Bob Lord's campaign for League presidency; the breakdown in relationship between the Football League and the affiliated Club members; and, the laborious negotiations with the PFA over the freedom of contract for players. This is not to assume that prior to this period the Football League's sole objective was to unbalance the FA's position in power, but, rather, any deliberate maneuver to unsettle the Football Association would have not been a priority. However, there was still clear resentment between the two football governing bodies – in fact, antipathy between the FA and Football League was highest to date. Indeed, during the campaign for League President, Bob Lord still found time to accuse leaders of the FA as being 'bumbling amateur legislators' (Inglis, 1988, p.268). Moreover and, significantly, in 1972, the Football League was embarrassed and undermined, ruthlessly, when Andrew Stephen of the FA finalised negotiations for television rights of the England verses West Germany game without consulting the

League. In fact, it is perhaps unsurprising that there is little reference of any conflict or, even, communication between the FA and Football League during the 70s; even if the Football League were not preoccupied with other issues it is likely that the Management Committee would have been unwilling to co-operate with an organisation (the FA) that were reluctant to communicate and took little notice of the League's existence. To date, the shifting power balances between the FA and Football League have been subtle but, of greater significance, is undoubtedly the inception of a breakaway league – the FA Premier League. The proceeding chapter will discuss the emergence of the FA Premier League and key events leading to its advent in 1992 and any significant subsequent developments thereafter.

9. 1980 – Present: Advent of the FA Premier League

The advent of a breakaway league for the elite clubs, controlled and administered by the Football Association, would suggest a significant shift in the balance of power between the FA and Football League. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the inauguration of the FA Premier League and, importantly, to recognise the importance of its emergence as a longitudinal process and, of course, the resulting extended power afforded to the FA. The advent of the FA Premier League did not occur overnight. In fact, the rebranding of English football's top division emerged as a consequence of a series of events that occurred processually, over an extended period of time. To locate exact dates as to when this process begun would be near impossible. Nevertheless, there were a number of significant events, to be discussed in this chapter, which occurred during the 1980s that would have undoubtedly increased the demand for a highly commercialised top flight league for English professional football (although it is likely that the process can be traced back to before the 1980s). In this regard, Lee states, 'present inequalities within the Premier League and between it [the FA] and the Football League can be traced back to at least as far as the mid-1980s' (1998, p.35).

There exists a plethora of reasons for why the FA Premier League was introduced and, indeed, these issues will be discussed in due course. However, fundamentally, one could argue that reasons for the Premier League's induction were, for the most part, economically based. Firstly, (bigger) clubs were spending irresponsibly which resulted in a number of clubs getting in to large amounts of debt and, consequently, needing

additional income. To give an extreme example, during the early 1980s, Manchester City Football Club bought a number of players, including: Steve Daley (£1.4 million); Steve Mackenzie (£250 000); Kevin Reeves (£1 million); Michael Robinson (£765 000) – to name a few, who were later sold at a loss (Inglis, 1988). In this regard, Inglis states that 'transfer fees simply went berserk at a time when the clubs could least afford them' (1988, p.299). In fact, clubs were spending freely during a time when money was sparse; Britain was in a recession during the early 1980s. Clubs were simply buying players they could not afford and, as a result, were in need of financial assistance. Secondly, during the 1980s football clubs were receiving less revenue from the fans. As highlighted by Inglis (1988), attendances (for clubs outside the top division) had reduced by eleven per cent by the 1980-1981 campaign and continued to reduce for the next five seasons[19]. This would have clearly put pressure on English football governing bodies to acquire income from other sources. For this reason, it would not be unthinkable to suggest that Football League and Football Association Committee members were looking for additional income at this early stage[20]. Clubs expenditure was increasing whilst income (from fans of less successful teams) was reducing – football clubs were in need of revenue from somewhere. In an attempt to increase revenue for football clubs, the FA Premier League would have been introduced to add excitement and popularity to a game that was not being well received, at the time, by those who were not devoted fanatics. In turn, this would have increased revenue for Football League clubs, particularly, through revenue

[19] With mass unemployment and Britain in recession, it is likely, for the most part, that many were unable to afford to watch a live football game. To give an example, the number of employees in Great Britain fell by 0.8% and, moreover, 1980 was the start of a dramatic rise in unemployment (Blanchflower and Burgess, 1996).

[20] Although, in reality, the Football League and Football Association have always been trying to acquire additional income but, however, a greater emphasis was placed on the need for revenue at this time.

from TV deals which, will be discussed in more detail later. To further understand this argument it would now be necessary to contextualise by describing the state of football during the 1980s.

Football, for many, did not have a favorable 'image' during the 1980s and would have deterred a number of people from watching the game. For instance, the press reported widespread football hooliganism although, as Dunning, Murphy and Williams (1986; 1998) highlights, spectator violence is not a contemporary issue and can be traced back to the games origins. Nevertheless, as Stuart Jones, Football Correspondent for *The Times* writes, 'the ugly disease of hooliganism has undoubtedly contributed greatly to the fall in games' (11 October 1982, p.19). However, the term 'ugly disease' places an over-emphasis on football related violence in relation to the fall in football attendances. Such un-scientific phrases sit uneasily amongst sociologists (especially figurational sociologists) and should, as such, be avoided. Nevertheless, the statement made by Jones does elaborate on how football hooliganism was a (part) contribution to the reduction in football attendances during the 1980s. From the evidence above, it is apparent that football was in need of reform during the 1980s. Elite clubs were spending more (and in danger of becoming financially unstable); football hooliganism was prevalent and, as such, gave football a 'negative' image in the domestic press; and, in the wider social context, British Economy was in recession and unemployment rates were increasing which, along with football hooliganism contributed to the reduction in football attendances at the time. However, ultimately, pressure from the elite clubs demanding more revenue (specifically from TV deals) would have led to the inception of a new

League that could negotiate for greater sponsorship revenue and better TV deal, in an attempt to resolve the poor state of English professional football during this period.

The merger of British Satellite Broadcasting [BSB] (founded 1986) and Sky Television plc (founded 1982) in November 1990 (branded as BSkyB) disturbed the cartel of the BBC and Independent Television (ITV) which previously televised English professional football games without serious competition – actually, BBC and ITV operated a bilateral monopoly (Baimbridge, Cameron & Dawson, 1996). Before now, both BSB and Sky Television plc, as individual entities, were unable to sufficiently challenge the BBC or ITV (due to inadequate funding) – as table 1 demonstrates:

TABLE 1: Broadcasting history of live televised football 1983 - 1997

Year	Length of Contract	Broadcaster	Live Matchers per Season	Annual Rights Fee (£)	£m per live match
1983	2 Years	BBC/ITV	10	2.6	0.26
1985	6 months	BBC/ITV	6	1.3	0.22
1986	2 Years	BBC/ITV	14	3.1	0.22
1988	4 Years	ITV	18	11.0	0.61
1992	5 Years	BBC/BSkyB	60	42.8	0.71

Source: Baimbridge, Cameron & Dawson, 1996).

The inauguration of BSkyB undoubtedly shifted extended power towards the more successful football clubs. With added competition for TV deals, the top football clubs had the power to negotiate for a better television deal and, potentially, break away to form a 'super-league'. In this regard, the FA Premier League (2002) highlight that 'as early as 1988 ten clubs had threatened to break away in order to take advantage of higher television revenue'. The Football Association recognised unrest amongst the Division

One clubs and, rather opportunistically, developed proposals for the FA Premier League which, importantly, provided the top clubs with a platform and, also, a unified voice to negotiate for a better television contract. Indeed, the FA Premier League generated much interest and was, without a doubt, a coup for the eventual successors BSkyB who paid £214 million over 5 years for the rights to show live Premier League matches[21] (Baimbridge, Cameron and Dawson, 1996). Although success may not have been immediate, by 1997 over 90% of all BSkyB subscribers opted for the Sky Sports channel where Premier League fixtures are shown and, also, during the same year, 25 of the top 30 programmes were Premier League football matches (Harbord and Binmore, 2000). In this regard, Harbord and Binmore state that, 'the industry perception is that sports broadcasting, and especially Premier League football, drives their [BSkyB] subscriptions' (2000, p.1).

In relation to this study, the inception of the Premier League organised and developed by the Football Association afforded extended power to the FA who now had jurisdiction over the most successful and wealthy football clubs in England[22]. This event was highly significant as it created, for the first time, a substantial gulf between the FA and the Football League who, as a result, had been reduced to governing the new Division One, Two and Three. Up to now there have been subtle shifts in power between the FA and Football League. However, the introduction of the FA Premier League, coupled with an alliance with BSkyB bolstered the Football Association's position in relation to the

[21] The £214 million incorporated money received from the BBC for the rights to show recorded highlights.
[22] The 1992 – 93 inaugural season included: Arsenal, Aston Villa, Blackburn Rovers, Chelsea, Coventry City, Crystal Palace, Everton, Ipswich Town, Leeds United, Liverpool, Manchester City, Manchester United, Middlesbrough, Norwich City, Nottingham Forrest, Oldham Athletic, Queens Park Rangers, Sheffield United, Sheffield Wednesday, Southampton, Tottenham Hotspur, Wimbledon.

governance of English professional football and, clearly, should be noted as a key event with regards to the impact on the dynamic power-balance ration between the FA and Football League.

Essentially, the FA increased their status and stronghold on the governance for domestic football since the organisation took change of the Premier League in 1992. This is not to say that the Football League have adopted a policy of consolidation in that the authority is content as the secondary governing body for football in England. To give a relatively recent example, in 2004, the Football League rebranded Division One, Two and Three to 'The Championship', 'League One' and 'League Two' respectively – here, this thesis will comment briefly on 'The Championship'. Statistics would suggest that rebranding the Football League structure had a positive effect on League clubs outside the elite Premier League. Specifically, The Times (2005) highlight that total attendance for the 2004 – 2005 season was 9.8 million – the fourth highest attendance for a European football league[23]. Whilst this may be a significant step towards reducing the gulf between the FA and Football League it does not change the hierarchy of governance for football, formally speaking. Indeed, it could be that English football is in good health, attendance wise, in comparison to the rest of Europe. Nevertheless, one cannot dismiss that rebranding the Football League may have had a positive effect on attendances outside the FA Premier League. Having examined the relationship and dynamic power balance between the Football League and FA up to present day it would now be appropriate to

[23] Top six divisions in Europe by total attendance: 1 - The Premiership (12.88m) 2 – Bundesliga [Germany] (11.57m) 3 – La Liga [Spain] (10.92m) 4 – The Championship (9.8m) 5 – Serie A [Italy] (9.77m) 6 – Ligue 1 [France] (8.17m).

conclude the findings and discuss what this investigation has found and, also, highlight limitations and any areas for further examination.

10. Conclusion and Discussion

Using the Football League Cup as a window for exploration, this thesis has investigated the dynamic relationship between the FA and Football League and, later, the relationship between the two domestic governing bodies for football in England and international football authorities – FIFA and UEFA. This chapter will discuss what was found and, also, highlight any limitations and areas for further investigation.

Although the purpose of this investigation was to examine the relationship between the Football League and the FA, this thesis has highlighted that a number of figurations contribute to what is a complex web of inter-dependent bodies. For instance, since the inception of the FA (1863) as the only governing body for 'football' in the world, there have, since then, been the development of other (domestic and international) bodies that have come to challenge, in different ways, its authority. Most notably, the inauguration of FIFA (1904) and UEFA (1954) and, of course the Football League (1888) have all impacted on the amount of power afforded to the FA. In fact, this thesis has highlighted that the London FA (simply known as the FA today) has been in conflict with other associations over an extended period of time and, therefore, must not be recognised as a contemporary issue. For example, the FA was often challenged by other local football associations with differing rules – especially, the Sheffield FA. Therefore the FA has been in conflict with other affiliations since the middle to late nineteenth century which, actually, makes it even more surprising that an academic analysis has not been conducted on the relationship between the FA and other organisations.

Specifically, this investigation has highlighted several key events that have impacted on the power-balance ratio – predominantly, the inauguration of the Football League Cup. It is suggested that there was an ulterior motive for the League Cup's inception. Indeed, the competitions advent was part of a wider policy proposed by Football League Committee Members that were never administered. The Football League Cup was introduced, partly, to offset the fixtures lost because of the proposed reduction in League size (which was not followed through). Also, this investigation has highlighted that the League Cup was introduced at a time when less people were watching live football which, again, makes the introduction of another football tournament even more surprising – undeniably, there were hidden motives for the inception of the Football League Cup. Arguably, the Football League Cup was introduced as an expression for power, in an attempt to supersede the FA – although, certainly, this would not have been voiced publicly.

Furthermore, This thesis has contradicted the common assertion that the Football League Cup is 'pointless' or lacks 'purpose' (BBC, 2008; Bleacher Report, 2008; Football Forum, 2008; The Mirror, 2008) - this is only the view of some fans who, specifically, follow elite football clubs. In fact, this investigation suggests that a number of developments occurred that increased the Football Leagues power chances including, most notably, entry in to Europe for the winners (1967 onwards). The advent of the Football League Cup allowed for greater negotiating (with UEFA at this point) and, actually, was used as a tool to shift the balance of power, albeit slightly, toward the Football League – importantly, suggesting, that its inception was far from 'pointless' (to Football League Committee Members at least). Upon investigation, this thesis has

highlighted other key events that have impacted, significantly, on the power-balance ratio between the Football League and FA – most notably perhaps, the advent of the FA Premier League.

In 1992 the Football Association developed a break-away league that consisted of the then most successful 22 clubs in England. Significantly, inauguration of the highly publicised FA Premier League undoubtedly shifted the balance of power towards the Football Association and, also, tethered relationships with the Football League. Undoubtedly, the FA increased their stronghold on the governance for English professional football as they bolstered their position as the leading authority for football. For the first time, one can see a distinct gulf between the Football League and Football Association with the FA being in control of the more successful teams in England which represents their inflated position. Notwithstanding, this thesis has unearthed some more subtle events that have contributed to the flux in relations between the Football League and Football Association, such as, the meeting of Joint FA and League Television Committee in 1972.

In 1972, the FA, for the first time, made a clear and blatant attempt to antagonise the Football League by asserting their extended power. Without consultation, Andrew Stephen of the FA agreed a £60 000 fee for the live transmission of England verses West Germany (£40 000 less than the Football League Wanted). Not only did this damage relations between the Football League and Football Association but, in relation to this thesis, it clearly represents the extended power afforded to the FA in that the Football

League answer to the Football Association. In fact, it would be appropriate to explain, at this juncture, that the Football Association has always been the leading governing authority for domestic football but, nevertheless, at times, the Football League has challenged this formal hierarchy. This thesis has exposed other disputes between that Football Association and Football League that undoubtedly contributed to the changing dynamic, including: the dispute between the Football League and Football Association over payment of footballers (1950s – 1960s) and; the conflict between League clubs and the FA over ticket allocation (1970s). Having concluded what has been found it would now be appropriate to provide recommendations on what is left to uncover.

Given that this thesis has highlighted that England and Scotland are the only countries who organise a second professional cup competition, of further interest would be a sociological investigation in to the advent of the Scottish Football League Cup (1947) and, again, on to the relationship between the Scottish Football League and the Scottish FA. Interestingly, the Scottish Football League Cup was introduced thirteen years prior to the English Football League Cup (1960) and, arguably, was partly an inspiration for the English Football League to launch a second domestic cup competition for football. Moreover, further sociological study could investigate the relationship between the football governing bodies of Scotland and England or, even, all football governing bodies within the British Isles.

The scope for further study in to the relationship between different domestic and, indeed, international football governing bodies indicates that this thesis is a benchmark

investigation which could lead to a plethora of further studies in to this football related phenomenon. In fact, investigation could go beyond examining the relations between various football governing bodies on to other professional football organisations such as the Professional Footballers' Association (PFA), League Managers Association (LMA) and the Professional Game match Officials board to name a few.

This thesis has traced the relationship and shifting power-balance between, predominantly, the Football League and FA and has discovered that the Football Association has, in fact, been in conflict with other organisations over an extended period of time. Central to this thesis, this investigation argues that the Football League Cup was introduced as part of an expression for power to challenge the Football Association as the leading authority for the governance of domestic football. Also, this examination has contradicted the comments made by some that the Football League Cup is 'pointless' and, in fact, the competition has proven to be a useful addition to lesser teams who have the chance to draw a 'big' club and, also, is an important asset to the Football League who were able to use the tournament as a 'tool' for negotiation. Nevertheless, although the FA has been challenged throughout their existence, the organisation remains the number one authority, formally speaking, for the governance of English professional football.

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APPENDIX

Football Association Revenue

This thesis is not investigating the financial climate of the Football Association and, for this reason, only selected data were used from the organisations accounts. The data were collated from the Football Association minutes, kept at the FA headquarters in Soho, London. Below are the net figures for total revenue accumulated by the FA and, also, net monies received from the FA Cup competition between the years 1947 - 1960. I begin with the year 1947 as it was the first league campaign following World War Two and was a particularly successful season and therefore deemed an appropriate starting point. Data are collated for each subsequent season[24] up to 1960; the inaugural season of the Football League Cup. These particular figures were gathered to give an indicator of the financial gains generated by the FA Cup and, importantly, how these figures measure against the FA's total income. I argue, in part, that the Football League Cup was inaugurated for economic reasons – the data recorded below helps identify whether this was an adequate argument.

Season	Net Profit (total)	Net Profit (FA Cup)
1947 – 1948	£212 512 12s 5d	£12 760 17s 10d
1948 – 1949	£274 969 16s 0d	£54 772 8s 6d
1949 – 1950	DATA MISSING	DATA MISSING
1950 – 1951	£281 530 6s 25d	£82 401 19s 2d
1951 – 1952	£293 031 14s 7d	£52 148 18s 0d
1952 – 1953	£285 217	£100 711
1953 – 1954	£306 959	£67 731
1954 – 1955	£279 592	£75 841
1955 – 1956	£302 423	£66 975
1956 – 1957	DATA MISSING	DATA MISSING
1957 – 1958	£394 585	£102 601
1958 – 1959	£397 859	£108 839
1959 – 1960	£409 721	£110 084

Sources: The FA minutes, 1947 – 1960.

[24] The FA minute books for seasons 1949 – 1950 and 1956 – 1957 were missing details for net profit (total) and net profit (FA Cup) and have therefore been omitted.